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ABSTRACT 
Rashid Munir 
A Quantitative Security Assessment of Modern Cyber Attacks 
A Framework for Quantifying Enterprise Security Risk Level Through 
System's Vulnerability Analysis by Detecting Known and Unknown Threats 
Keywords: Enterprise Network Security; Vulnerability Analysis; Security 
Assessment; Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
Cisco 2014 Annual Security Report clearly outlines the evolution of the threat 
landscape and the increase of the number of attacks. The UK government in 
2012 recognised the cyber threat as Tier-1 threat since about 50 government 
departments have been either subjected to an attack or a direct threat from 
an attack. The cyberspace has become the platform of choice for 
businesses, schools, universities, colleges, hospitals and other sectors for 
business activities. One of the major problems identified by the Department 
of Homeland Security is the lack of clear security metrics. The recent cyber 
security breach of the US retail giant TARGET is a typical example that 
demonstrates the weaknesses of qualitative security, also considered by 
some security experts as fuzzy security. High, medium or low as measures 
of security levels do not give a quantitative representation of the network 
security level of a company. In this thesis, a method is developed to quantify 
the security risk level of known and unknown attacks in an enterprise 
network in an effort to solve this problem. The identified vulnerabilities in a 
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case study of a UK based company are classified according to their severity 
risk levels using common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) and open web 
application security project (OWASP). Probability theory is applied against 
known attacks to create the security metrics and, detection and prevention 
method is suggested for company network against unknown attacks. Our 
security metrics are clear and repeatable that can be verified scientifically.  
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Chapter 1.  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The Internet is evolving at a remarkable rate in all areas of society. 
Nowadays, it is recognized as a de facto standard for data communication 
especially for large organizations such as government agencies, laboratories 
and universities having a large number of potential users [1]. The prompt 
increase in Internet traffic and emerging complexities in computer network 
activities has led to growing network attacks through the Internet, which has 
put a great impact on the security requirements (availability, confidentiality 
and integrity) of critical data information. These attacks cause disruption to 
business processes leading to increase the risk associated to the security of 
the information technology (IT) systems [2], [3]. It is however, important to 
ensure that despite these attacks, computer systems continue to operate and 
deliver the services they are intended for. 
Firewalls, antivirus and, network intrusion detection and prevention (NIDP) 
systems are some examples of the security countermeasures which are 
deployed by most of the organizations to prevent their assets against 
malicious intrusion [4]. In small organizations, security management uses 
conventional scanning tools such as firewalls and antivirus programs to 
detect and prevent networks from malicious attacks, but these tools generate 
too many false positives and also have very limited attack detecting rate. 
Whereas at enterprise network, NIDP systems are the security 
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countermeasures used to detect and prevent attacks occurring on the 
network. Despite of the availability of current security countermeasures, still, 
it is difficult to determine the security risk level of a network.    
According to [5], determination of security level depends upon factors such 
as threats, policy updates, emergence of new vulnerability and network 
traffic. Among these factors, vulnerability plays a key role in exploiting a 
network since it gives invitation to intruders to attack the network. The bigger 
the network, the higher will be the number of vulnerabilities, therefore leading 
to higher level of security risk [6], [7].  
Quantification of network security risk level is a tedious and lengthy process. 
However, it is less challenging to assess the security risk level of a small 
organization with limited resources as compared to a large organization 
having complex infrastructure. Hence, at an enterprise network level, there is 
a need to design automated tools that can evaluate the impact of all 
vulnerabilities present in it. For this purpose, security management uses 
various kinds of vulnerability scanning tools (VST) [4] to assess 
vulnerabilities in a network. The results produced by these VST can be 
helpful to any network administrator to determine the qualitative security risk 
level. These results are expressed in terms of fuzzy values such as low, 
medium and high, which do not describe the overall associated network 
security risk level quantitatively.  
Nowadays, security community’s major concern is to solve open research 
questions such as hardening a network with less effort, interpreting the 
relationships among the resources and determining the techniques used by 
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attackers to achieve their targets. Less efforts have been made towards 
quantitatively measuring the overall security risk level of enterprise networks 
[8], [9], [10].  
Network attack graph is one of the most prominent solutions used in network 
security because it gives details of all the possible attack paths due to 
vulnerability. This evaluation system helps IT management to increase the 
performance and secure their network by remediating the high prone 
vulnerability with low prone vulnerability.  It, however, does not provide the 
overall quantitative security risk level of an enterprise network [11]. It was 
suggested by [12] that to determine the security risk level of an organization, 
metrics are considered as a helpful approach. Network security is only 
manageable if it can be measured. Therefore, the introduction of quantitative 
metrics to measure overall network security risk level can assist the 
organizations prioritising threats and vulnerabilities.  
1.2 Why creating security metrics is so tough? 
While creating a metric, there are two questions that need to be answered: 
the “What”, and the “How”. The “What” is answered by the object that needs 
to be quantified. The “How” is answered by the repeatability, clarity and 
authority of the metric created for. The main objective is to make clear 
statement of what is to be measured as well as usefulness of the metric. 
There is a need to look at the methods deployed to achieve repeatability of 
that metric. For example, looking at some classic metrics in other disciplines 
such as data centre service level agreement, the metrics used are mean time 
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to failure (MTTF), mean time to repair (MTTR), availability and response 
time. The classic metrics used by organizations are as follow:  
 Mean time between failures (MTBF) is the frequency of failure; 
 MTTR is the duration of failures once it occurs; 
 Availability is just the probability that the user needs to access the 
service when it is required and  
 Response time deals with the quality of the service.  
Organizations use the above-mentioned metrics to measure, monitor and 
evaluate their systems. Particularly, these metrics are employed to define the 
desired service levels in most agreements. In an enterprise network security, 
the questions that are always raised by the organizations are:   
 Are we secure?  
 Are we spending too much in terms of time or money?  
Although, these are good questions in principle but in general, it is difficult to 
answer them efficiently. Defining the metrics to answer some of these 
questions requires a detailed breakdown of the question into number of 
questions that target specific smaller areas to contribute the bigger picture. 
Presently, security tools answer these questions in terms of high, medium 
and low. These are qualitative metrics which do not convey the effectiveness 
of the network security management system. Quantitative metrics can 
provide a better picture of the security risk level in the enterprise network.  In 
order to create quantitative metrics for the network security risk level of an 
enterprise network, there is a need to identify the 4-tuples associated to the 
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risk; 1) the vulnerability, 2) the threat due the vulnerability, 3) the impact of 
the threat and,4) the value of affected assets in case if threat is successful.  
1.3 Motivation 
As, the number of attacks are increasing, it is becoming increasingly 
apparent that many companies do not apply appropriate risk management 
techniques [13], [14], [15]. It is suggested by [16] that companies can reduce 
their risk posture if they apply basic risk management techniques by about 
80%. Statistics shows that the challenges in protecting companies are fast 
growing. It is not possible any more to ensure a good security level by just 
relying on blocking the attacks as they appear. A number of security initiative 
such as intrusion detection system (IDS), intrusion prevention system (IPS) 
and antiviruses are mostly reacting to security events. In order to create a 
successful signature, an event/attack needs to be happened. However, a 
report by [13] shows that attacks are being used new ways to attack 
companies.  
Many businesses and even country stability have been affected by 
successful cyber-attacks. In order to reduce the impact of these attacks, this 
work is looking at how organizations can have a better understanding of their 
security level. Qualitative risk analysis has been beneficial but it does not 
provide a quick and easy way to understand the security level of a company. 
This thesis is developed with the ambition to support the security 
communities in providing a new method to quickly and easily understand 
security risk level. As a result of this new metric system, the companies can 
quickly react to challenges. 
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1.4 Aims and Objectives 
The basic aim of this research is to develop a method that quantitatively 
assess the security status or risk level of IT networks in terms of attacks. The 
main objectives of this research are: 
 Evaluation of an existing UK organization for the purpose of 
classifying and identifying the vulnerabilities contained in a real 
network.  
 Developing a security metric based on measurements in the form of 
vulnerabilities gathered from the network. 
 Applicability of probabilistic theory to determine the overall security 
risk level of each department and entire organization’s network in 
terms of absolute value. 
 Analysis of various attacks to define the invisible attack.  
 Introducing a method of assessing the security risk level of IT 
networks in terms of invisible attacks, and providing a solution to 
detect and prevent from these invisible attacks by incorporating 
enterprise network security countermeasure. 
 Performance comparison of enterprise security countermeasures 
Snort with Suricata for the purpose of selecting the best NIDP system 
in terms of packet handling capability for creating NIDS security 
metrics based on different traffic speeds.   
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1.5 Research Contributions 
The main contributions of this research are: 
 To develop a security metrics based on the measurements in the form 
of vulnerabilities collected from an existing UK organizational network.  
 To analyse various attacks to define the invisible attack and introduce 
a new method of assessing the security risk level of IT networks in 
terms of invisible attacks. 
 Performance comparison of enterprise security countermeasures 
Snort with Suricata for the purpose of selecting the best NIDP system 
in terms of packet handling capability for creating NIDS security 
metrics based on different traffic speeds.   
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 gives some overview of basic security 
parameters such as risk assessment, metrics etc. followed by a detailed 
background information to understand the entire thesis.   
A novel security metric is introduced in Chapter 3 to evaluate the security risk 
level of any enterprise IT network using probability theory by incorporating 
vulnerability scanning tool (VST). Probabilistic approach is then applied to 
calculate the overall security risk level of sub-networks and entire network. 
These metrics can be valuable for any network administrator acquiring an 
absolute risk assessment of a network. 
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In Chapter 4, a new method is proposed to quantitatively evaluate the 
security risk level of invisible attacks. This chapter provides the classification 
of all invisible attacks according to their characteristics against IT, business 
network and critical infrastructure. A way to detect and prevent organization 
from invisible attacks is suggested and then the security risk level is 
estimated.  
Chapter 5 deals with initial research phase to carry out a performance 
evaluation of NIDP systems as a background to our preliminary testing. 
Extensive testing scenarios are implemented on a highly sophisticated test-
bench using various platforms and configurations. A detailed performance of 
Snort as a de facto IDS standard versus Suricata is investigated under 
different traffic conditions. The tests are conducted on host and virtual 
systems configurations to explore the system response in different 
deployments. Packet drops as an identified limitation of software-based IDS 
in high-speed environments is discussed in this chapter. A security metric is 
also developed based on the results achieved from the experiments. 
In Chapter 6, a brief review of the results of the previous chapters along with 
some general comments is given and proposed future work is also 
presented. 
 
 
 
  
9 
 
 
Chapter 2.  
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Network security is the most vital component in information security as it is 
responsible for securing all information passed through networked 
computers. In order to understand how to secure a network, the concepts 
and literature related to network security need to be reviewed. The methods 
that are the building blocks of designing the network security risk metrics and 
the different standards as used in network security are also discussed 
therein. 
2.1 Network Security 
This section describes security properties, vulnerabilities and attacks. 
2.1.1 Security Properties 
In information technology (IT), security is the logic of prevention malware to 
enter into a system or a network. It is also called a degree of protection 
against intrusion in hostile environment and is defined as “Measures adopted 
to prevent an unauthorised use, misuse, modification, or denial of use of 
knowledge, facts, data or capabilities” [17]. According to [18], security is 
particularly a combination of three main properties: confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of information. The brief description of each property is given 
as follows: 
 Confidentiality  
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Confidentially is also known as secrecy or privacy. It refers to the assurance 
that the computer related assets are only accessed by the authorized parties 
[19], [20], [21].  
 Integrity  
It is the assurance that information can only be accessed or modified by the 
authorized users. It ensures that network messages remain complete, 
correct and authentic, and are not modified by unauthorized parties [20], [21].   
 Availability 
This property ensures that only authenticated users having specific 
authorization can access system and work with information, assets and 
resources when required [22], [23].  
2.1.2 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is the manifestation of the inherent state of the system which is 
exploited by intruder to damage/harm the system or network. It can also be 
called a flaw, bug, weakness or an exposure of an application. In IT security, 
it performs a special role in opening the ways for attackers to endanger 
computer system’s security [24], [25]. An Attacker can take advantage of a 
vulnerability holes to disrupt a network to achieve the target. According to 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the numbers of 
vulnerabilities are increasing due to increase in computer usage and its 
resources [26].   
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2.1.3 Attacks 
With the advancement in technology and the increasing dependencies of our 
societies on usage of network information systems, the risk of attacks on 
networks especially at enterprise level has been tremendously increased 
[27]. In computer terminology, attack or threat can be defined as an attempt 
to compromise security properties of a system or communication network 
[28]. According to [29], an attack is a specific technique designed to exploit a 
vulnerability contained in the configuration, implementation or management 
of an entity to achieve the desired target. Three conditions must be met for 
any attack to be carried out against an enterprise network;  
 The network under attack should have vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited. 
 The resources available to the threat agent must be sufficient to carry 
out the attack in mind. 
 The attacker must be driven by a motive whether it is recreational, 
profit oriented or vengeance. 
When these conditions are satisfied, an attack is said to be eminent. Analysis 
of the vulnerabilities in the enterprise network is the first step in ensuring that 
the network is guarded against attacks [30]. Depending on their nature, 
attacks can be classified into two main categories: physical attacks and 
cyber attacks [31].  
  
12 
 
 
2.1.3.1 Physical Attacks 
Physical attacks also called insider attacks are generated from inside the 
organization by legitimate users based on level of authority granted to them 
[32], [33].These attacks intentionally violate the organization security policies. 
Figure 2.1 shows some of the examples of physical attacks. As, most 
enterprise networks have policies to prevent against exportation of 
information from the company by blocking the use of unauthorized external 
storage drives. DeviceLock, Sanctuary Device Control, USB blocker to 
mention but a few are some of the tools and applications used at the 
enterprise level to monitor the workstations and enforce the policies.  
 
Figure 2.1: Organizations' insider attacks [34]. 
There are also ways of manipulating Windows Group Policy Objects (GPO) 
to restrict USB access but this has been difficult to achieve in practice. If an 
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enterprise does not enforce these kinds of policies and external drives are 
allowed unto the network, a disgruntled employee is able to bring in an 
infected drive. Once this drive is installed/ plugged into the workstation, the 
network is easily compromised as it is attacked from inside the organization 
from a legitimate source.  
2.1.3.2 Cyber Attacks 
These attacks are also called outsider attacks or computer network attacks 
(CNAs). It is a deliberate attempt employed by individual or group of people 
to: 
 Damage computer networks; 
 Gain unauthorized access to computer system or a network and 
 Disrupt business infrastructure processes and equipment operations 
by hacking into a vulnerable system.  
 Cyber Attacks Characteristics 
Cybercriminals opportunistically scan the Internet against information 
communication technology (ICT) systems having some pre-existing 
vulnerabilities such as lack of antivirus, security countermeasures, 
weaknesses in installed programs or faulty system. The system containing 
vulnerabilities is considered most susceptible of cyber attacks. Once the 
system exploited via malicious code, it can be easily controlled by an 
attacker [35]. Figure 2.2 depicts some of the possible cyber attacks on 
enterprise network.  
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Figure 2.2: Cyber-psychopathic. 
2.2 Risk 
In IT, risk can be defined as a potential that a chosen action or activity lead 
to loss. It determines the possible impact of attack on a particular system or 
network through vulnerability. Information security risk assessment identifies, 
measures and prioritizes the risks based on attack impact, likelihood and 
affected IT assets. According to [36], risk is the product of the likelihood of an 
event occurred and its impact on information technology assets, i.e. 
Risk = Attack likelihood * Impact 
Moreover, the impact of an event on an information asset is further equal to 
the product of asset vulnerability and asset value to its stakeholders. Now, IT 
risk can be equal to: 
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Risk=Attack likelihood* Asset value* Vulnerability 
Thus, in the light of the risk equation, the threat (Attack likelihood), asset 
value and vulnerability are the most critical parameters in measuring the 
overall security risk that should be taken into account. Asset value is the 
easiest to measure among the three parameters [37]. In IT security, the basic 
components of security risks are vulnerability, capability and threat, where 
the term capability refers to the adversary ability and capacity to access the 
target. 
2.3 Metrics 
In IT security, metrics are used to quantify the results achieved through a set 
of measurements. The enterprise level organizations use various metrics to 
meet their desired targets. For example, security metrics are used to 
determine how much organization is secure enough. Business metrics 
describe business progress in a measurable form. Project metrics are used 
for the projects to determine whether the goal is achieving or not.  
Metrics provide companies a way to prioritize their threats and vulnerabilities, 
and calculate the risks posed on information assets depending upon 
quantitative or qualitative measurement [38]. Qualitative metrics define the 
assessment process leading to non-numerical value and are hard to analyse. 
On the other hand, quantitative metrics are easy to understand. These are 
normally in numerical form and are often used for ranking purpose. 
Metrics and measurements are two different types of entities. Metrics are 
derived from comparison of two or more sets of mathematically relevant and 
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quantifiable attributes taken over a period of time, e.g. the number of attacks 
detected by intrusion detection systems (IDSs). Measurements are numeric 
values generated through counting and are assigned to a specific attribute 
based upon pre-defined criteria. These are usually called objective raw data 
and specify the number of dimension, size and quantity of a particular 
attribute of a process or product, e.g. the number of IDSs used to prevent 
network against malicious activity.  
2.3.1 Categories of Security Metrics 
Security metrics are classified into three categories, as follows: 
 Organizational Metrics 
These metrics are related to industry operators or users of supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) control systems, and play an important 
role in making decisions such as which assets are critical to attack? Are the 
protections in place sufficient to protect the information? 
 Operational metrics 
These metrics describe security posture, risk management, support 
measures, threat environment, incident response and vulnerability 
management practices of an organization. These should refer to the factors 
or attributes being affected by risk related situations.  
 Technical metrics 
These metrics describe and compare technical objects like algorithms 
specifications and architectures, alternative designs products, etc. These are 
generally associated with technical standards, supports of IT products, 
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technologies, architectures and level of risk to operate a system in a given 
configuration environment.  
2.3.2 Security Metrics Significance 
Metrics are helpful tools for security analysts in identifying the level of risk in 
the organizations. These tools can be used to distinguish the effectiveness of 
different components of security programs and also increase the level of 
security awareness within the organization [37], [39]. Metrics make easier for 
analyst to answer hard questions raised from higher authorities such as:  
 How do we compare to others in this regard? 
 Are we secure enough? 
 Are we more secure than yesterday? 
 How much the current network is secure? 
 How vulnerable is this network to specific attack mechanism? 
2.4 Intrusion Detection Systems 
The prevalent use of sophisticated technologies like web services, remote 
access and distributed database in networks communities has raised new 
issues in terms of network security. To protect these networks from malicious 
attacks, the most sophisticated tools are required to provide accurate and 
reliable protection against malware. An intrusion is defined as a malicious 
internally or externally operational fault or the result of partially or completely 
successful attack [40]. To detect and prevent intrusion at an enterprise level, 
the IDSs are utilized. These are a combination of hardware and software that 
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generate alert when any intrusion occurs [41]. The idea of IDS was first 
introduced in 1980 by James Anderson when he distinguished between the 
characteristics of anomalous and normal behaviour in the anomaly detection 
approach [42]. The IDSs have been developing in the response to unwanted 
malicious traffic that may potentially compromise the functionality of the 
network [43]. One of the key features of any IDS is to analyse the activities 
running on the system and to monitor the data provided by the users. The 
IDS generally comprises several components operating in conjunction to 
offer protection against malicious activities. Main IDS components are as 
follows:  
Sensors:  The IDS sensor sits upon the network and logs the traffic after 
sniffing it in a promiscuous mode and generates an alert on the console. 
Console: The IDS console provides user interface, where a network 
administrator may take notice of any current attack alerts. 
2.4.1 Types of IDS 
Based on the location in a network, IDS are broadly classified into two main 
categories: Host based IDS and Network based IDS. 
2.4.1.1 Host based IDS 
Host based IDS (HIDS) is installed locally on a host computer and is capable 
to analyse that traffic which is coming to and originating from the particular 
computer. In case of attacks by other than the particular computer on 
network, HIDS cannot be able to detect it. HIDS has ability to monitor system 
activities such as files access system of a host, host network traffic, users’ 
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logon activities, running processes, computer integrity and windows registry, 
etc. OSSEC is an example of HIDS, which is an open source platform 
dependent tool supporting OpenBSD, Macintosh, Window and Solaris 
operating systems. Some of the advantages of HIDS are as follows: 
 They have the ability to verify whether the attack was successful or 
not. 
 They can identify those attacks that originate from inside the host. 
 Since, HIDS can analyse the decrypted traffic to estimate attack 
signature thus leading to monitor encrypted traffic as well. 
 These are cost effective for a small network of few computers. 
However, HIDS has some drawbacks. 
 They can be compromised immediately as the host server is 
compromised by an attack.  
 They consume more computing power from the host where it is 
installed. 
 In case of denial of service attacks, their performance is not effective.  
2.4.1.2 Network Based IDS 
Network intrusion detection and prevention (NIDP) systems are set up in a 
network to monitor traffic for any suspicious activity in order to prevent the 
network from being compromised. These systems run as an independent 
platform treating network traffic as a supply of data. A NIDP system uses 
predesigned policies to detect any unauthorised activity on the network. It 
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performs a deep search of the monitored in-coming and out-going traffic to 
detect malicious packets in a network. Once it detects a malicious packet, it 
informs the system administrator through an alert or blocks that malicious 
packet to avoid network compromise. A NIDP system contains a group of 
sensors that are positioned on tactical ends to capture the traffic on a 
network. SNORT is an example of NIDP systems. These systems are always 
used in addition to other security countermeasure tools like firewalls and anti-
virus systems. The NIDP systems in addition to network monitoring functions 
can also perform other duties which include: 
 Maintains data and file integrity by scanning the system files for any 
unauthorized activity.  
 Detects any changes in the server core components. 
 Matches known remote hacking attempts or network compromise 
patterns by scanning the server log files.  
 Scans local firewalls or network servers for any potential exploits. 
One of the shortfalls of the NIDP systems is that it depends upon the policy 
design to protect the network. So misconfiguration can lead to exposure of 
the network or false positives on the network. False positives are created 
when legitimate traffic is treated as suspicious traffic. NIDP system products 
have always built in policies which can be rewritten to customize to the 
specific organization. The systems also allow new policies to be written into 
the configuration file. The policies defining the traffic monitoring rules are 
what to be used to generate alerts in case of any suspicious activity. These 
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rules fall into two categories: 1) the default rules provided by the product 
vendor are classified according to CVSS standard, and 2) the customised 
rules written by the organization’s network management team can be 
classified using the preferred network security standard. 
The rules created in NIDP system help the network management to assess 
the security risk level of their network based on the priority attached to the 
attack impact associated with the rule. 
2.5 Vulnerability Scanning Tools 
Vulnerability assessment (VA) tools also called security scanning tools 
provides help in scanning firewalls, network and software applications. These 
tools run on the periodic basis and are generally used to generate the 
vulnerability reports of technical and management issues in the form of texts, 
charts or graphs, which are useful for companies’ network administrators to 
make their network secure. Following is a comparison of some of the popular 
VA tools. 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Vulnerability Scanning Tools. 
Features 
Tools 
Nessus Nexpose SAINT Nipper Retina 
Commercial      
GUI      
Home feed 
version 
scans up to 
16 32 16 32 256 
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IP addresses 
Cost per 
year 
£600 £15400 
per user 
£5200 £26 per 
device 
£750 
Supported 
platforms 
Kali Linux, 
Fedora, 
Mac OS,  
Red Hat, 
Linux, 
Win XP & 
above, 
Server 
2003 & 
above 
Kali Linux, 
VM ware  
ESXi,  
Red Hat, 
Win 7 
&above, 
Server 
2008 
&above 
Linux, 
Mac OS, 
OpenBSD, 
FreeBSD 
Fedora, 
Mac OS, 
Centos, 
Linux, 
OpenSuSE, 
Ubuntu 
Windows XP 
and above, 
Windows 
Server 2003 
&above 
Supported 
Browsers 
Safari, 
Firefox, 
Google 
Chrome, 
Opera, IE 
10 & 
above 
IE 9 
&above, 
Mozilla 
Firefox, 
Google 
Chrome 
IE 9, 
Firefox, 
Safari 
- - 
System 
hardware 
requirements 
3-4GB 
RAM 
2 GHz 
Processor, 
100 Mbps 
NIC 
10+GB 
disk space 
2 GB RAM 1 GB RAM 
&250 MB 
disk space 
1.4 GHz 
Processor, 
512 MB 
RAM &1GB 
disk space 
 
Now the characteristics of the VA tools are discussed as follows. 
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2.5.1 Nessus 
It is one of the popular VA tools, which was initially free and open source till 
2008 [44]. It is helpful in configuring, patching and auditing the networks and 
provides a platform for compliance monitoring, vulnerability management, IT 
risk management, attack detection and mitigation.  It is regularly updated by 
more than 46,000 plug-ins [44]. Some of its features are: 
 It scans those vulnerabilities that can be exploited remotely to access 
network data or systems. 
 It scans any misconfiguration in the network, for example, missing 
patches. 
 It scans weak passwords used in the network, where it sometimes 
launches hydra to perform a dictionary attack. 
 It scans the presence of invalid packets using the TCP/IP which can 
be used for denial of service attacks.  
 It helps in auditing the payment card industry data security standards.  
2.5.2 Nexpose 
It is a universal vulnerability management tool providing reliable and prompt 
decisions to assess the security risk level of networks [45]. Its key functions 
are to detect, assess and mitigate the security risk level exposed by 
vulnerabilities, misconfigurations and policy violations, and to analyze 
malware in any IT environment having different operating systems, web 
applications and databases. Because of its features, it is highly efficient than 
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other VA tools. It is a stand-alone software providing user interaction through 
web browser [45]. It works with Metasploit (attack generating tool) to exploit 
vulnerabilities and calculates their weightage through CVSS, and then 
validates the security risk.  
2.5.3 SAINT 
The conventional tools describe fuzzy security risk level of a network by 
incorporating vulnerability severity level (VSL) prioritization such as high, 
medium and low [46].  The SAINT Corporation takes this prioritization to the 
next level by providing the ability to sort, filter, and prioritize threats by 
mapping industry-recognized identifiers. Its main functions include: 
 Identifying exploitable vulnerabilities on the networks and its 
resources. 
 Detecting and fixing any point of weakness before exploitation. 
 Anticipating and preventing common system vulnerabilities. 
 Auditing the systems and configurations for compliance with 
regulatory standards. 
 Scanning the content of the network nodes for data that is not 
authorized to be stored there. 
 Generating the vulnerability assessment repots in the specified 
formats. 
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2.5.4 Retina 
It is a commercial VA tool written by well-known security research team 
called eEye [46]. It is used to efficiently assess the security risk level by 
discovering, fixing and prioritizing vulnerabilities of enterprise network. It 
provides fast, flexible deployment to increase remote and local security 
across all IT assets. It uses a regularly updated vulnerability database.  
2.5.5 Network Infrastructure Parser (Nipper) 
This tool is used to assess the security risk level of network devices such as 
firewalls, routers, and switches [46]. Before the release of Titania software, 
Nipper was used as a free open source tool for analysing device 
configuration file. Its security audit [46] report contains the detail regarding 
software versions, authentication passwords, authentication services, VPN 
configuration, Web services, time synchronization, logon messages, name 
resolution services, firewall rules, intrusion detection/prevention, routing 
protocols, cryptographic settings, logging and printing services etc.  
2.5.6 Secunia Personal Software Inspector 
It is also a free scanning tool designed to detect vulnerable and outdated 
programs, and plug-ins, which provide invitation to attack the system [46]. It 
is normally run on a stand-alone machine but at an enterprise level, Secunia 
corporate software inspector tool is employed to scan more than one 
computer in a network.   
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2.5.7 Open Vulnerability Assessment System 
Open Vulnerability Assessment System (OpenVAS) is an open source VA 
tool [46]. It is easy to use having less plug-ins than Nessus. Most of the 
OpenVAS components are licensed with GNU. This tool is updated on daily 
basis because of supporting high standard organizations.    
The VST are helpful in network security assessment, and network 
administrators use them to determine the list of existing vulnerabilities on a 
system or network [46]. Although the achieved information is useful, but not 
enough to measure the network security risk level. If the vulnerabilities listed 
as many, there is need for other methodologies to be employed to group and 
quantify these vulnerabilities. The security metrics proposed in this work is 
able to take this list of vulnerabilities and provide a single value representing 
the absolute overall security risk assessment level of the network. 
2.6 Related Work 
Measuring security metrics have always been a big challenge due to various 
reasons. For instance, the security posture of an enterprise environment can 
significantly change when a program (software) is updated; when a new 
hardware is added or removed; and when a security policy is added, 
changed or removed. Different approaches have been utilized to quantify the 
security of enterprise environments. In this section, we review previous 
research efforts related to security metrics such as attack graphs, the 
topological vulnerability analysis, IDS metrics, and security metric for 
unknown attacks. Some of these methodologies are discussed below. 
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2.6.1 Attack Graph 
One of the most common methods used by many researchers to assess the 
security risk level of network is the attack graph [47]. This idea was first 
suggested as a supportive method to assist network administrators in 
measuring the security of a network based on security attributes and 
vulnerabilities. It focuses on the “attack-centric” view of the system [48]. An 
attack graph is considered appropriate if it is easy to understand and 
consumes less time in evaluating the vulnerabilities contained in a system, 
and also should be adaptive according to the system configuration [49].  
 
Figure 2.3: Attack graph [51]. 
The Figure 2.3 gives a simple example of a network structure with a 
corresponding attack graph, where file server (Host 1) is running file transfer 
protocol (ftp), secure shell (ssh) and remote shell (rsh) services, whereas, 
database server (Host 2) is running only ftp and rsh services. Firewalls is 
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introduced to filter the traffic from host 0 so that only ftp, ssh and rsh traffic is 
allowed to reach to the server side. In the attack graph on the right, the oval 
shapes represent the vulnerabilities and the texts inside the ovals show the 
conditions. The first and the second number in the parentheses indicate the 
source host number and destination host number respectively.  The idea of 
attack graph was initiated by [50] who suggested that a system could be 
treated as a privilege graph exhibiting operational security vulnerabilities with 
each node represents a set of privileges owned by the user and each edge 
denotes vulnerabilities. A Markov model was then applied to those 
vulnerabilities in order to determine all possible paths that could be exploited 
by an attacker based on mean time to failure (MTTF) approach. 
Failure to always be able to calculate the MTTF in even the smallest graphs 
led to [48] suggesting a new approach of using the optimal shortest path 
calculations to measure the system vulnerabilities. In their follow up work, 
[52] developed attack graph tool used three inputs: 1) the attack templates 
which define the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the system, 2) the 
configuration file which describes the system architecture, and 3) the 
attacker profile which defines the skills of the attacker. The attack graph was 
then constructed from the initial state using forward exploration method in 
order to provide all the possible paths that an attacker could take to 
compromise the system and the possible undesirable activities that the 
attacker could perform once inside the system.   
Later, another approach called model checking approach was implemented 
as an input to the attack graph to assess the overall security of a network 
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based on interaction of the vulnerabilities, which could be identified with the 
help of various scanning tools such as System Scanner by ISS [53], Nessus 
[44] and CyberCop by Network Associates [54], etc. Ref. [55] incorporated 
unmodified model checker SMV approach in their work, but the problem with 
this technique is, it can obtain only one counter-example i.e., only one attack 
corresponds to an unsafe state. A service running on a single host can 
provide much better security than many services running on an individual 
host. This scheme can be applied to a variety of real-world problems like 
security, reactive system analysis, fault tolerance, operating systems, 
hardware design and protocol analysis [56]. The SecurlTree, a commercial 
threat risk assessment tool usually called capabilities-based attack tree 
analyser developed by [57] is easy to use threat risk analysing software 
package. It is widely used in defence and intelligence organization, nuclear 
power stations, health care providers, critical infrastructure companies, 
aerospace manufacturers, financial organizations, national laboratories and 
consulting companies. It shows all possible paths and set of resources that 
attacker can utilise to reach the desired target. After constructing the attack 
graph, the next step is to create descriptions of the goal and capabilities of 
each possible threat source. All the description is stored in threat agent 
profile which can be used and reused in different analyses. By using 
SecurlTree graphical interface, a network analyst can easily describe threats 
and system vulnerabilities.   
Another approach to measuring security metrics was proposed by [58], 
where a new view of the attack graph construction was introduced. It was 
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argued that the main purpose of using attack graph was to represent pre and 
post-conditions of an exploit in the form of chain that could be used by 
security management to find out the ways through which attackers reached 
the desired target. Therefore, the attack graph was reintroduced as a state 
transition diagram in which each state indicates defender, attacker or 
system. Defender and system were related to action chosen by an attacker 
which led to changes in the overall state of the system. To produce and 
analyse this specific type of attack graph, model checking algorithm NuSMV 
and GraphViz visualization package had been utilized. In [59], they 
compared their work to [48] and it was found that Sheyner attack graph 
method was more general than [48]. Another disparity was noted in that 
Sheyner worked backwards from the goal state to construct the attack graph 
while Swiler constructed the attack graph starting from the initial state using 
the forward exploration algorithm. The backward algorithm saved the time by 
avoiding the exploration of the non-important paths in relation to a specific 
attack. However, the paths due to vulnerabilities irrelevant to the end goal 
may not be explored.  
To analyse the security of enterprise network, it was necessary to figure out 
multi-stage and multi host attacks [11], [60]. Since, the configuration of one 
system affects the security of others in a network; security management is 
required to develop such attack graph tools, which should automatically 
identify the potential security vulnerabilities and configuration of a network. 
Then, the network administrator would be able to select appropriate 
countermeasures to prevent it from the possible malware attacks accordingly 
  
31 
 
 
[8]. In this regards, a network security analyser, multi-host, multi-stage 
vulnerability analysis language (MulVAL) was proposed to help the user in 
understanding the causal relationship between successful attacks and 
system configuration [61]. It takes output from VST to model possible 
attacks. It shows the logical associations among attack goals and 
configuration information based on logical programming [62], [63]. This graph 
has size polynomial to the network being evaluated. A node in the graph 
represents a logical statement, which does not specify the entire state of the 
network, but only a part of it, whereas, edges describe the causality relations 
between network configurations and an intruder’s potential privileges [64]. A 
network security planning architecture (NetSPA) was another multiple 
prerequisite attack graph generating tool for security management to analyse 
thousands of vulnerabilities in a very short period of time [11]. This tool was 
incorporated to create network model by exploiting firewalls rules and 
network VST. This had the capability to report vulnerabilities having severe 
impacts on the network and to models zero day attacks by supposing that 
each software was vulnerable [47]. 
With the help of automated attack graph, it was possible to replicate high 
prone vulnerabilities with low impact vulnerabilities [65]. Further, it was 
claimed that a network with less number of vulnerabilities could offer better 
security as compared to the one with high number of vulnerabilities. To 
determine the possibility of future attacks, a method was proposed for 
generating network attack graph using data mining scheme based on 
DARPA 1999 and 2000 alerts datasets, generated from network intrusion 
  
32 
 
 
detection system (NIDS) [66]. As most of intrusion alerts achieved from the 
datasets might be of type false positives; therefore, it was difficult to 
determine which alerts were appropriate for evidence of intrusion prediction. 
An atomic domain was reported another simple and scalable attack graph 
generating approach, where the whole network was transformed into atomic 
domains representing the hosts with specific privileges but the work did not 
cater for overlapped vulnerabilities [67].  
The work on Bayesian network (BN) was reported in [68] to model all 
possible atomic attack phases in a network.  The same work was further 
explored by [51] and proposed a dynamic BN, which comprised sequence of 
variables considered as states of hidden Markov chain model having 
Markovian property in which the current state depends upon the previous 
state of the system. It is a graphical model for probabilistic inferences, which 
coordinates users to monitor and update the system with respect to time and 
also helps to predict further behaviour of the system or entire network. To 
make a secure network, it is necessary to measure its security based on 
different network configurations, i.e. topology, connectivity, etc. It was 
claimed that the proposed model efficiently described the security of an 
enterprise network. The BN was also implemented by [69] to generate attack 
graph using MulVAL tool to check whether the scheme was helpful in 
security analysis or not. In this approach, the BN used the information 
generated by IDS. Although these approaches provide ways to measure how 
vulnerabilities in a system can be exploited but they are unable to measure 
the absolute network security risk level quantitatively.      
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The topological vulnerability analysis (TVA) approach introduced by [70] 
showed all possible attack paths in a network based on node’s individual and 
collaborative vulnerabilities. The attack graphs used the network 
vulnerabilities and the potential attacker profile to compute the overall 
security of the network. This approach had many advantages over many of 
its predecessors, for example, it provided the potential paths of vulnerability 
from which mitigation methods could be deduced, it employed algorithms 
that worked efficiently in big network setups.  The TVA tool can also be used 
to generate an attack graph for 37000 vulnerabilities.  
One of the biggest hindrances in securing a network is the zero-day attack 
that exploits system vulnerabilities. A novel security metric was proposed in 
[39] by counting the number of vulnerabilities required to compromise a 
network. This is an interesting work; however, it has some limitations such as 
the lack of vulnerability ranking, which we account for in this study.  
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of different methods and tools that were 
explored during this study. Assessing the security risk at enterprise level is 
an essential step for network security communities now-a-days. Metrics are 
helpful tools for security analyst in identifying the security risk level within an 
organization as well as answering many security risk related questions. 
Network administrators are keen to attain a quantitative value rather than 
qualitative results. Various security metrics systems exist such as attack 
graphs but they do not provide the overall security risk level of the network.    
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Chapter 3.  
QUANTITATIVE SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT OF KNOWN 
ATTACKS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a novel security metric is introduced which extends from 
common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) to create an absolute value as 
the risk level of a system. The proposed methodology is applied to a 
computer network of an existing UK based organization with several 
departments. Nexpose [71] vulnerability scanning tool (VST) is incorporated 
to collect all vulnerabilities from the network. On the basis of CVSS 
standards, the vulnerabilities are classified into one of three possible levels: 
critical, severe and moderate. The security risk level of each department is 
computed using probability theory on VST data. In addition, the overall 
security risk level of the entire network is also computed. The purpose of 
these metrics is to facilitate the network administrator a valuable way to 
assess the security risk level quantitatively.   
3.2 Common Vulnerability Scoring Systems (CVSS) 
Vulnerability assessment plays an important role for security posture and risk 
management. To measure the severity level of vulnerability, there is a need 
of well-defined security metrics which should be based on scientific 
evidence, systematic and quantitative approaches. The CVSS provides a 
tool to quantify the severity and risk of a vulnerability to an information asset 
in an IT environment [47]. The reason for selecting CVSS in our experiments 
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is four fold: 1) it is a completely free open source standard, 2) it provides a 
prioritized framework, 3)it helps in scoring IT security vulnerabilities, 4) it is 
globally accepted and adopted by the industry. This standard was first 
launched by National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) in July 2003 and 
the latest version (CVSS-3) works under the supervision of the Forum of 
Incident Response Teams (FIRST). The CVSS facilitates the user with a 
composite score by means of vulnerability showing the overall severity and 
security risk of a system. It is a useful language especially designed for 
application vendors, researchers, IT managers and vulnerability bulletin 
providers [72]. It is generally composed of three metric groups: base, 
temporal and environmental, each consisting of a set of metrics. All these 
metrics generate a numeric value in the range from 0 to 10. These metric 
groups are discussed in the following sections.   
3.2.1 Base Metrics 
The base metric group expresses the characteristics of vulnerability, which 
are constants with respect to time and user environments. Figure 
3.1classifies the base metrics into two categories: access metrics and impact 
metrics. Access metrics includes vector, complexity and authentication which 
show how the vulnerability is accessed and whether or not extra conditions 
are required to exploit it, whereas, impact metrics contain confidentiality, 
integrity and availability which measure how exploited vulnerability can 
directly affect IT assets [73], [74].Figure 3.2 depicts a screenshot sample of 
CVSS base scoring calculator used to determine the base score of 
vulnerability. If vulnerability has no impact on confidentiality, integrity and 
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availability, then base score is zero. The base metrics results are further 
utilized in calculating temporal scores of temporal metrics.   
 
Figure 3.1: The Base metric group. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Base metric screenshot. 
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3.2.2 Temporal Metrics 
This metrics group represents the characteristics of time dependent 
vulnerability. The factors involved in calculating the metrics are exploitability, 
remediation level and report confidence as shown in Figure 3.3. The 
exploitability depends upon the exploiting technology as well as the tools 
availability. It identifies the current status of the exploited technique or code 
availability. If code is accessible and easy to use, then severity risk level of 
vulnerability will be high. If vulnerability becomes common, the risk of attack 
will become high eventually leading to increase in temporal metrics score.  
 
Figure 3.3: Temporal metric screenshot. 
Remediation level investigates the severity level of vulnerability in terms of its 
remediation like temporary fix or official fix. The temporal score of 
vulnerability increases if it is not officially patched. The report confidence 
measures the degree of confidence in the presence of known vulnerability 
and credible technical details.  
3.2.3 Environmental Metrics 
Environmental metrics group captures those vulnerability characteristics that 
are uniquely associated with a particular user's IT environment. This group 
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uses base and current temporal scores to assess the severity risk level of 
vulnerability in the context of the way that the vulnerable product or software 
is deployed. Figure 3.4 classifies the Environmental metrics into two main 
categories; collateral damage potential and target distribution, along with 
three other security requirements. Collateral damage measures the potential 
for a loss of physical equipment, property damage or loss of life and target 
distribution measures the relative size of the field of target system 
susceptible to the vulnerability. The three security requirements; 
confidentiality, integrity and availability allow the environmental score to be 
fine-tuned according to the user’s environment.  
 
Figure 3.4: Environmental metric screenshot. 
3.3 Proposed Approach 
Quantifying the level of network security has become a challenging problem 
especially for an enterprise environment [75], [76]. Various commercial and 
non-commercial tools have been introduced in the literature employed by 
network administrators to assess the security risk levels of their networks 
[77].These tools provide only fuzzy quantification of security risk level in 
terms of high, medium and low. This makes it hard for a network 
  
39 
 
 
administrator to know the level of risk associated with the network. However, 
there is a need for a new quantitative security metrics which should provide 
an absolute value of the overall security risk level of a network. The 
enterprise network structure can be broken down into the smallest network 
resources in order to measure the security risk generated by known 
vulnerabilities. This is the approach used in the design of this methodology.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Network diagram. 
The enterprise network is divided into departmental networks and, which in 
turn are further subdivided into network nodes. The different vulnerabilities 
are taken into account and then, by using different probabilistic approaches, 
a metric is designed based on known attacks providing security risk 
assessment level of the respective network.  
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3.3.1 Test Bench 
In order to measure security risk level of enterprise networks based on 
known vulnerabilities, a UK based company containing 16 nodes and a 
switch. The company infrastructure design and operating systems installed 
on nodes are illustrated in Figure 3.5. As shown, the network setup 
consisting of 16 nodes is connected through the ProCurve Series 2900 
switch to the SME server, which is responsible for monitoring all incoming 
and outgoing traffic. A list of all vulnerabilities in the network is collected by 
deploying Nexpose VST. After running full scan, 1777 vulnerabilities of 
different types have been discovered and are listed in appendix A.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Distributions of operating systems. 
Figure 3.6 shows the number of nodes running on different operating 
systems at the time of vulnerability scanning. Five operating systems are 
employed in which Microsoft Windows XP Professional SP3 on seven nodes, 
Apple Mac on six nodes, Linux, Motorola embedded and ProCurve Series 
Switch on one node each. 
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Figure 3.7: The number of nodes vs. different services. 
Figure 3.7 shows different services provided by operating systems running 
on the network. During scanning, it is found that 23 services are operated. 
Out of which Microsoft Remote Display Protocol (MS-RDP) service is running 
on 12 nodes, Common Internet File System (CIFS) service is on 8 nodes and 
so on. 
 
Figure 3.8: The number of vulnerabilities related to each of the services. 
Figure 3.8 illustrates that CIFS service is most vulnerable to attacks because 
it contains higher number of vulnerabilities as compared to other services. 
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Note that CIFS is a standard protocol that allows computer users to share 
files across intranet as well as the Internet.  
 
Figure 3.9: Most common vulnerabilities categories by percentage (%). 
During the scan, 1592 vulnerabilities were found related to the Adobe 
category making the network the most susceptible to attacks. The adobe-
reader-APSB12-16-cve-2012-2049, windows-hotfix-ms12-078, adobe-
apsb12-22-cve-2012-5262, adobe-flash-apsb13-05-cve-2013-0638, adobe-
apsb12-07-cve-2012-0773, adobe-reader-apsb12-08-cve-2012-0775, adobe-
reader-apsb12-08-cve-2012-0774, adobe-reader-apsb12-08-cve-2012-0776, 
adobe-apsb11-28-cve-2011-2450 and adobe-reader-apsb13-02-cve-2013-
0612 are the vulnerabilities, which pose the highest risk to the organization 
as shown in the appendix A. By using the temporal metric from CVSS 
standard, vulnerability risk scores are calculated based on the likelihood of 
attack as well as the effects associated with a successful attack. The 
achieved scores are then multiplied by the number of instances of the 
vulnerability on the network to come up with the final risk score. 
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3.3.2 Vulnerability Classifications by Severity Risk Level 
The list of vulnerabilities classified according to CVSS standard is shown in 
Table 3.1.   
Table 3.1: Nodes by vulnerability severity. 
Nodes Operating Systems Critical Severe Moderate 
N1 Linux 2.6.18-308.24.1.e15 2     12 8 
N2 ProCurve Series 2900 
Switch 
2 - 2 
N3 Microsoft Windows 7 
professional Edition SP1 
- 2 - 
N4 Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 - - - 
N5 Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 - - - 
N6 Microsoft Windows 7 
Professional Edition SP1 
- 2 - 
N7 Microsoft Windows XP 
Professional SP3 
365 68 3 
N8 Microsoft Windows XP 
Professional SP3 
365 68 3 
N9 Microsoft Windows XP 
Professional SP3 
365 68 3 
N10 Motorola embedded - - 1 
N11 Microsoft Windows 7 
Professional Edition SP1 
- 2 - 
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N12 Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 - - - 
N13 Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 - - - 
N14 Microsoft Windows XP 
Professional SP3 
365 68 3 
N15 Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 - - - 
N16 Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 - - - 
 
It is clear from Table 3.1 that the total vulnerabilities collected through 
Nexpose VST are 1777. Some of them are having high-impact while others 
have either medium-impact or low-impact on the company’s network.  
 
Figure 3.10: Nodes by vulnerability severity 
Figure 3.10 shows the distribution of vulnerabilities over different nodes. It 
can be observed that six nodes contain critical vulnerabilities, eight nodes 
having severe vulnerabilities and seven nodes comprise moderate 
vulnerabilities, whereas the remaining six nodes are free from any 
vulnerability. 
0
2
4
6
8
Critical Severe Moderate Clean
N
o
d
e
s 
Vulnerability severity 
  
45 
 
 
3.4 Results and Discussions 
Three scenarios are constructed which quantitatively assess the security risk 
level of the existing UK company network in terms of absolute value. Let 
critical, severe and moderate vulnerability be represented by C, S and M 
respectively. Suppose Ni represents the ith node in the network, then security 
risk level of each department and entire network can be computed with 
respect to all vulnerabilities, and individual vulnerabilities in terms of C, S and 
M. The scenarios are divided into following three: 
 Scenario-I details the method of calculating the probability of attack on 
each department in terms of C, S and M. 
 Scenario-II provides the method of calculating the probability of attack 
on each department in terms of total known vulnerabilities. 
 Scenario-III provides the method of calculating the probability of attack 
on company network. 
3.4.1 Scenario-I 
In this section, the probability of attack on IT (𝑃𝐼𝑇), Finance (𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑛), Sales 
(𝑃𝑆), Engineering (𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺)and Human Resource (𝑃𝐻𝑅) departments with 
respect to critical, severe and moderate vulnerability is calculated. These 
probabilities are determined using total law of probability as detailed below: 
𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑛(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝐶)
5
𝑖=3
                                                                                                   (3.1) 
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𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑛(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖)𝑃(𝐶/𝑁𝑖)
5
𝑖=3
 
𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑛(𝐶) = 𝑃(𝑁3 ∩ 𝐶) + 𝑃(𝑁4 ∩ 𝐶) + 𝑃(𝑁5 ∩ 𝐶) 
𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑛(𝐶) = 𝑃(𝑁3)𝑃(𝐶/𝑁3) + 𝑃(𝑁4)𝑃(𝐶/𝑁4) + 𝑃(𝑁5)𝑃(𝐶/𝑁5) 
Now, using Table 3.1, 
𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑛(𝐶) =
1
3
.
0
2
 +  
1
3
.
0
0
 +  
1
3
.
0
0
 
⇒ 𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑛(𝐶) = 0                                                                                                                     (3.2) 
Similarly, 
𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑛(𝑆) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑆)
5
𝑖=3
= 33%                                                                                      (3.3) 
𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑛(𝑀) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑀)
5
𝑖=3
= 0                                                                                          (3.4) 
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝐶)
8
𝑖=6
= 55.7%                                                                                (3.5) 
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺(𝑆) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑆)
8
𝑖=6
= 43.7%                                                                                 (3.6) 
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐺(𝑀) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑀)
8
𝑖=6
= 0.4%                                                                                 (3.7) 
𝑃𝑆(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝐶)
10
𝑖=9
= 41.8%                                                                                     (3.8) 
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𝑃𝑆(𝑆) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑆)
10
𝑖=9
= 7.8%                                                                                         (3.9) 
𝑃𝑆(𝑀) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑀)
10
𝑖=9
= 50.3%                                                                                 (3.10) 
𝑃𝐼𝑇(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝐶)
13
𝑖=11
= 0                                                                                          (3.11) 
𝑃𝐼𝑇(𝑆) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑆) =
13
𝑖=11
 33.3%                                                                                (3.12) 
𝑃𝐼𝑇(𝑀) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑀) =
13
𝑖=11
0                                                                                        (3.13) 
𝑃𝐻𝑅(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝐶)
16
𝑖=15
= 0                                                                                         (3.14) 
𝑃𝐻𝑅(𝑆) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑆)
16
𝑖=15
= 0                                                                                         (3.15) 
𝑃𝐻𝑅(𝑀) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖⋂𝑀)
16
𝑖=15
= 0                                                                                       (3.16) 
Since there is no critical (C) or moderate (M) vulnerability found in Finance 
department, therefore, this department is 100% secure in terms of critical 
and moderate known vulnerability as shown in Eq(3.2) and Eq(3.4). From 
Eq(3.3), the security risk level with respect to severe vulnerability is 33%, 
which implies that the Finance department is 67% secure according to 
known vulnerabilities. From Eqs 3.5-3.7, the Engineering department is 
44.3% secure in terms of critical vulnerability, 56.3% secure in case of 
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severe vulnerability and 99.6% secure with respect to moderate vulnerability. 
Now, from Eqs 3.8-3.10, it is clear that the Sales department is 58.2% secure 
in terms of critical vulnerability, 92.2% secure in case of severe vulnerability 
and 49.7% secure with respect to moderate vulnerability. From Eqs 3.11-
3.13, it is noted that there is no C or M exists in the IT department, therefore, 
this department is fully secure in terms of critical and moderate 
vulnerabilities. The only vulnerability found is S; due to this, the department 
is 67% secure. Finally, since there are no vulnerabilities found in the HR 
department, this department is 100% secure in terms of all vulnerabilities as 
is evident from Eqs 3.14-3.16.  
3.4.2 Scenario-II 
The next step is to calculate the security risk level of attacks on each 
department with respect to total vulnerabilities. These probabilities are 
calculated using inclusion-exclusion principle of probability. By using the 
same notation as in the previous scenario, the probability of attack on the 
finance department (𝑃(𝐹𝑖𝑛)) is calculated by 
𝑃(𝐹𝑖𝑛) = ∑(−1)𝐾+1 ( ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖3 ∩ 𝑁𝑖4 ∩ 𝑁𝑖5)
3≤𝑖3<𝑖4<𝑖5≤5
)                                  (3.17) 
5
𝐾=3
 
Where the value of K and i is the position of the node in the department 
network as shown in Figure 3.5. 
= (−1)3+1 ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖3)
3≤𝑖3≤5
+ (−1)4+1 ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖3 ∩ 𝑁𝑖4)
3≤𝑖3<𝑖4≤5
+ (−1)5+1 ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖3 ∩ 𝑁𝑖4 ∩ 𝑁𝑖5)
3≤𝑖3<𝑖4<𝑖5≤5
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=  ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖3)
3≤𝑖3≤5
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖3 ∩ 𝑁𝑖4)
3≤𝑖3<𝑖4≤5
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖3 ∩ 𝑁𝑖4 ∩ 𝑁𝑖5)
3≤𝑖3<𝑖4<𝑖5≤5
 
= 𝑃(𝑁3) + 𝑃(𝑁4) + 𝑃(𝑁5) − 𝑃(𝑁3 ∩ 𝑁4) − 𝑃(𝑁4 ∩ 𝑁5) − 𝑃(𝑁3 ∩ 𝑁5)
+ 𝑃(𝑁3 ∩ 𝑁4 ∩ 𝑁5) 
⇒ 𝑃(𝐹𝑖𝑛) = 0.1%                                                                                                            (3.18) 
𝑃(𝐸𝑛𝑔) = ∑(−1)𝐾+1 ( ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖6 ∩ 𝑁𝑖7 ∩ 𝑁𝑖8)
6≤𝑖6<𝑖7<𝑖8≤8
)                                  (3.19)
8
𝐾=6
 
=  ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖6)
6≤𝑖6≤8
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖6 ∩ 𝑁𝑖7)
6≤𝑖6<𝑖7≤8
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖6 ∩ 𝑁𝑖7 ∩ 𝑁𝑖8)
6≤𝑖6<𝑖7<𝑖8≤8
 
= 𝑃(𝑁6) + 𝑃(𝑁7) + 𝑃(𝑁8) − 𝑃(𝑁6 ∩ 𝑁7) − 𝑃(𝑁7 ∩ 𝑁8) − 𝑃(𝑁6 ∩ 𝑁8)
+ 𝑃(𝑁6 ∩ 𝑁7 ∩ 𝑁8) 
𝑃(𝐸𝑛𝑔) = 24.5%                                                                                                             (3.20) 
𝑃(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) = ∑(−1)𝐾+1 ( ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖9 ∩ 𝑁𝑖10)
9≤𝑖9<𝑖10≤10
)
10
𝐾=9
(3.21) 
=  ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖9)
9≤𝑖9≤10
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖9 ∩ 𝑁𝑖10)
9≤𝑖9<𝑖10≤10
 
= 𝑃(𝑁9) + 𝑃(𝑁10) − 𝑃(𝑁9 ∩ 𝑁10) 
𝑃(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) = 24.6%                                                                                                          (3.22) 
𝑃(𝐼𝑇) = ∑ (−1)𝐾+1 ( ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖11 ∩ 𝑁𝑖12 ∩ 𝑁𝑖13)
11≤𝑖11<𝑖12<𝑖13≤13
) (3.23)
13
𝐾=11
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= ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖11) −
11≤𝑖11≤13
∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖11 ∩ 𝑁𝑖12)
11≤𝑖11<𝑖12≤13
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖11 ∩ 𝑁𝑖12 ∩ 𝑁𝑖13)
11≤𝑖11<𝑖12<𝑖13≤13
 
= 𝑃(𝑁11) + 𝑃(𝑁12) + 𝑃(𝑁13) − 𝑃(𝑁11 ∩ 𝑁12) − 𝑃(𝑁12 ∩ 𝑁13) − 𝑃(𝑁11 ∩ 𝑁13)
+ 𝑃(𝑁11 ∩ 𝑁12 ∩ 𝑁13) 
𝑃(𝐼𝑇) = 0.1%                                                                                                                   (3.24) 
𝑃(𝐻𝑅) = ∑ (−1)𝐾+1 ( ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖15 ∩ 𝑁𝑖16)
15≤𝑖15<𝑖16≤16
)
16
𝐾=15
                                        (3.25) 
=  ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖15)
15≤𝑖15≤16
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖15 ∩ 𝑁𝑖16)
15≤𝑖15<𝑖16≤16
 
= 𝑃(𝑁15) + 𝑃(𝑁16) − 𝑃(𝑁15 ∩ 𝑁16) 
𝑃(𝐻𝑅) = 0                                                                                                                         (3.26) 
The security risk level of each department in terms of total vulnerabilities is 
demonstrated in Figure 3.11.  
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Figure 3.11: Department wise security risk levels. 
Finance and IT departments have the same security risk level i.e. 0.1%, 
which implies that these departments are 99.9% secure. The security risk 
levels of Engineering and Sales department are almost the same with a 
difference of 0.1%. Since no vulnerability is found in HR department during 
the scan, therefore, the department is 100% secure.  
3.4.3 Scenario-III 
After calculating departmental security risk levels, the inclusion-exclusion 
principle of probability is also employed to calculate the company network 
security risk level with respect to total known vulnerabilities. Let 𝑃(𝑁) be the 
probability of attack on the entire network, then by inclusion-exclusion 
principle, we have: 
𝑃(𝑁) = ∑(−1)𝐾+1 ( ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩ 𝑁𝑖𝐾)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2…<𝑖𝐾≤16
)
16
𝐾=1
(3.27) 
𝑃(𝑁) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1)
1≤𝑖1≤16
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩  𝑁𝑖2) +
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2≤16
∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩  𝑁𝑖2 ∩  𝑁𝑖3)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2<𝑖3≤16
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− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩  𝑁𝑖4)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖4≤16
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩  𝑁𝑖5)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖5≤16
 
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩  𝑁𝑖6)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖6≤16
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩  𝑁𝑖7)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖7≤16
 
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩  𝑁𝑖8)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖8≤16
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩  𝑁𝑖9)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖9≤16
 
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩ 𝑁𝑖10)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖10≤16
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩  𝑁𝑖2 … ∩  𝑁𝑖11)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖11≤16
 
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩ 𝑁𝑖12)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖12≤16
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩  𝑁𝑖2 … ∩  𝑁𝑖13)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖13≤16
 
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩ 𝑁𝑖14)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖14≤16
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩  𝑁𝑖2 … ∩  𝑁𝑖15)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖15≤16
 
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑁𝑖1 ∩ 𝑁𝑖2 … ∩ 𝑁𝑖16)
1≤𝑖1<𝑖2……<𝑖16≤16
 
After expanding Eq(3.27) and using Table 3.1, for probabilistic values; 
𝑃(𝑁) = 28.9%                                                                                                                  (3.28) 
This shows that the security risk level on company’s entire IT network is 
28.9%, which implies that the network is 71.1% secure.   
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the proposed methodology used to quantify the 
security risk levels of any enterprise IT network. The method was designed 
using a case study of a UK company, which was electronically scanned by 
Nexpose VST to identify the vulnerability level. The vulnerabilities were then 
classified according to CVSS standard (critical, severe and moderate). 
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Probability theory was applied to calculate the overall security risk level for 
each department and the entire network. The work done in this chapter used 
the known vulnerabilities acquiring from the network as the prime factor for 
calculating the risk metrics. These metrics are valuable for any network 
administrator to acquire an absolute risk assessment value. In next chapter, 
unknown vulnerabilities and human factors will be considered as a source of 
vulnerabilities that may affect the security risk level of a company. 
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Chapter 4.  
RISK METRICS FOR INVISIBLE ATTACKS 
4.1 Introduction 
Today, information systems that are commonly used can be abused to 
exploit network vulnerabilities. One of such systems is the Google search 
engine. Given the increasing dependence of our societies on networked 
information systems, the level of sophistication of cyber attacks that target to 
compromise enterprise networks have risen a great deal in the last decade. 
These attacks have evolved thereby making it increasingly challenging to 
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate traffic. Cybercrimes are a 
great threat to the enterprise networks because in most cases severity of the 
threat is not known until it is too late. This is due to many factors such as 
inadequate skilled network administrators and, lack of collaboration between 
the authorities, the computing companies and the research communities [78], 
[79]. Currently, despite the efforts being provided by security communities to 
secure networks, a strong sense of insecurity still prevails. This calls for 
creation and development of new methods to counter cyber attacks that can 
cause businesses to fail [80].  
At any time, a network system has much vulnerability which involves in many 
factors such as human factor, known and unknown vulnerabilities, etc. These 
vulnerabilities are exploited during attacks. Unknown vulnerabilities create a 
huge challenge in the network due to its invisibility to the security measures 
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setting up in the system. Consequently, these vulnerabilities lead to invisible 
attacks, which can create traffic treated as a normal or legitimate in a 
network. In this chapter, a new way of looking at attacks based on visibility to 
the security setup is proposed. Here, those attacks are considered which 
target the critical infrastructure of the information and business networks [79].  
To clearly understand the steps involved in assessing the security risk level 
of an enterprise network, attacks are categorised into four different levels of 
visibility. The emphasis of this study is on one level of attacks known as the 
invisible attacks. One of the major source of these attacks is the Google 
dorks which lists all the information it finds on the networks including 
sensitive information that can be exploited by intruders [81], [82].This  attack 
is usually seen as genuine traffic to the network security setup posing a 
challenge for which a countermeasure is required. Based on the analysis, a 
method for detecting and preventing invisible attacks is proposed. 
Furthermore, open web application security project (OWASP) risk rating 
methodology is applied on the enterprise network to assess the overall 
severity risk level of the invisible attacks. This method basically provides 
severity risk level in terms of high, medium and low which are not 
quantitative values, therefore, severity risk assessment table is incorporated 
to enable the retrieval of the quantitative risk value.   
4.2 Visibility of Attacks: An Overview 
Based on visibility on the system, attacks can be classified into the following 
four categories:  
 Visible attacks 
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This category is composed of those attacks, which are visible to network 
security systems comprising well defined signatures database of known 
attacks. The signature based techniques also called knowledge based 
techniques are then applied to match the pattern of attack with the signatures 
database. If any pattern is matched, the network security system will 
generate an alert against the security violation. 
 Visible behaviour 
This category typically consists of those attacks that can be detected and 
prevented by well configured security countermeasures. These 
countermeasures observe the traffic and compare its pattern with the base 
line, and identify the norm for the network by performing activities like 
bandwidth inspection, protocol examination and ports evaluation. During 
packet filtration, if any suspicious traffic behaviour is found, the security 
countermeasures will generate an alert against it.   
 Visible inside the host 
This type of attacks is partially carried out inside the local system. Some 
rootkit or malware requires a restart after installation. Rebooting the system 
can be visible within the local host, but not on a network level. Malware 
generally performs modifications on system files; therefore, it is necessary to 
have a full picture of the attack to understand the changes made on local 
systems.  
 Invisible attacks 
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In this category, attacker actions are generally considered as legitimate 
actions, therefore, this type of attack is not concerned for network security 
systems. For instance, a computer sends information out to another 
computer. This is a completely legitimate action. However, sending data from 
one computer to another may not be considered as a legitimate if the 
previous action is a brute force attack on root passwords. One of the 
prominent invisible attacks is the Google dork which is discussed in the 
following Section. 
 
Figure 4.1Google advanced search. 
4.2.1 Google Dorks 
These are the commands being utilized to search necessary information 
about companies, can help the intruders to build a profile of their targets [81], 
[83]. It is a type of social engineering attack in which the attacker uses 
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Google advanced search engine shown in Figure 4.1 to collect sensitive 
information about the target.   
Due to poor systems configuration, search engines gather more information 
than required while crawling the web using search operators. Table 4.1 
provides a list of possible operators for different search services that can be 
used by intruders to generate invisible attack.  
Table 4.1: Google search operators. 
Search Service Search Operators 
Web Search filetype, allinanchor, inanchor, site, intext, intext, 
inurl, related, allintext, allintitle, allinurl, cache, 
define, id, info, intitle, phonebook.     
News intext, intitle, inurl, allintitle, allintext, source, allinurl, 
location. 
Groups intext, allintext, author, allintitle, intitle, insubject, 
group.  
Product Search allintitle, allintext 
Image Search site, allinurl, allintitle, intitle, filetype, inurl,   
Directory filetype, ext, allintext, intext, inurl, intitle, allintitle, 
allinurl 
 
Now-a-days, many search engines like Google have been used as hacking 
tools and this is becoming a critical challenge for network security 
communities to secure their information against invisible attacks, as most of 
the security countermeasures do not take this attack into account.  
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Figure 4.2Google attack scenario. 
A particular attack scenario using search engine properties is illustrated in 
Figure 4.2, which shows that how a well written query in Google advanced 
search engine can be used to retrieve sensitive information such as 
usernames and passwords. The achieved information can be decrypted 
quickly using readily available cracking tools and further can be utilized in 
generating attacks. The system will treat this illegitimate user as a legitimate 
one and therefore, the employed security countermeasures on the network 
will be rendered useless.  
4.2.1.1 Types of Invisible Attacks 
Vulnerabilities exposed by search engines has been growing rapidly, 
therefore, there is a need to analyse them specifically. Based on their 
  
60 
 
 
characteristics, invisible attacks are classified into 9 groups given in Table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2: Google hacking database categories. 
No. Attacks Number  of 
commands 
1 Files containing username and passwords in clear 
text 
30 
2 Files containing username and passwords in 
encrypted form. 
21 
3 Already login websites 4 
4 Error code message (404) 7 
5 Blogs / Forums 33 
6 Pages contain login portal 116 
7 Sensitive directories or files containing juicy 
information 
134 
8 Vulnerable information 129 
9 List of emails 2 
 
4.3 Proposed Approach 
Security metrics are considered effective techniques to measure the extent 
to which an organization meets its security objectives. Conventional security 
metrics generally focus on qualitative risk assessment of known attacks and 
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vulnerabilities. Most of them utterly ignore the presence of invisible attacks in 
evaluating the overall security risk assessment of IT networks. The proposed 
methodology deals with invisible attacks like Google dorks and provides a 
way of detecting and preventing networks, and also assesses the network 
security risk from these attacks. To use the methodology, a list of Google 
dork commands are constructed (detail is given in Appendix B) and, are 
analysed and categorised in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 respectively. The 
proposed scheme is composed of two scenarios and its effectiveness is 
evaluated using UK based company. In first scenario, a generic NIDS rule is 
constructed to monitor and protect the company network against invisible 
attacks.  In second scenario, OWASP tool is incorporated to assess the 
security risk level affected by these attacks.  
4.3.1 Test Bench 
The under consideration company consists of Finance, Engineering, Sales, 
Information Technology and Human Resource departments as shown in 
Figure 4.3.The data of each department is restricted to those who work 
within that department. The company has its own web server through which 
all communications to and from the outside world take place. It is important 
to note that the company is unaware of invisible attacks due to insufficient 
knowledge. Signature based NIDP system is deployed in between firewall 
and web server to protect company sensitive information as it has the 
capability of detecting and preventing it from malicious intrusion by having a 
deep inspection of data packets.   
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Figure 4.3: Network diagram. 
4.3.2 Results and Discussion 
To identify and quantify the security risk level against invisible attacks, two 
different scenarios are developed for the UK based company’s network. 
These scenarios will investigate the two different areas of interest.    
4.3.2.1 Scenario-I 
In this scenario, one of the solutions of detecting and mitigating the risk of 
invisible attacks on the company network is discussed. Several Google dork 
commands have been generated using Google advanced search engine. It is 
found that confidential information of Sale department can be disclosed by 
Google dorks. The retrieved data contains important information such as 
employees’ username, passwords, contact details, etc. To protect the Sale 
department data from Google dorks, signature based NIDP system is 
deployed in between firewall and web server as shown in Figure 4.3. The 
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basic purpose of firewalls is to block access to specific services by acting as 
security personnel at the network gateway. The NIDP system is deployed to 
detect and report any intrusion attempt to network administrator. It performs 
its function by carrying out deep data flow inspection after the firewalls. 
Various kinds of NIDP systems are available in the literature such as Snort, 
Dragon, RealSecure, etc. in which Snort is a tool of choice in this study due 
to its features that will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. One of the 
features that make it attractive is its lightweight rules description language, 
which is very flexible and powerful. Snort enables users to write their own 
rules that can be used as a policy to filter the network traffic.  
To mitigate invisible attacks, the rule shown in Figure 4.4 is created, 
designed and tested using Snort, and is stored in its database to be further 
utilized as a policy.  
 
Figure 4.4: Snort rule. 
As shown in Figure 4.4, the particular NIDP system rule can be divided into 
two parts: 1) rule header, and 2) rule options. The text up to the first 
parenthesis written in blue colour represents the rule header. The section 
enclosed in parenthesis is the rule options, and the words before the colons 
in the rule options section are termed as option keywords. The rule header 
basically defines the packet’s “who”, “where” and “what”, and also gives the 
detail about the response. The rule's action, protocol, source /destination IP 
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address and source /destination ports are certain fields that should be 
included in the rule header. The rule action, which is the first field in the rule 
header, guides the NIDP system what to do when it finds a packet that 
matches the rule criteria. By default, there are five actions available in the 
selected NIDP system; each action defines the certain behaviour, as follows.  
Alert~ generates an alert and then logs the packet 
Log~ logs the packet 
Pass~ ignores the packet 
Activate~ alerts and activates the dynamic rule 
Dynamic~ remains idle until activated by an activate rule, then acts as 
a log rule 
In this scenario, the executed action is “Alert” as it is very important from 
security point of view that network administrator should be notified 
immediately for immediate action. The next field defined in the rule header is 
protocol and currently, the selected NIDP system is capable to analyse traffic 
for TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols for suspicious characteristics. In the 
created rule, TCP protocol is employed.  
There is no need to specify source/destination IP and source/destination port 
numbers because this rule is responsible to inspect traffic coming in from or 
going to any machine.  The Alert messages and packet sections to be 
inspected are described in the rule options, which contain contents that the 
packet information should match for the packet to be flagged as malicious. In 
our case, if a packet contains certain Google dork operators such as filetype, 
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allintext and allintitle etc. in message contents, then NIDP system will alert 
the administrator by a generating a message composed in the next field of 
rule options section. The other fields in the rule option section are thresholds, 
which specify interval alerts. In the created rule, threshold with type limit is 
used to generate alert after every 2 minutes. 
 
Figure 4.5: The alert received when a test case is performed by trying to 
query using Google dork operators on the network. 
After adding the created rule in NIDP system rules database to evaluate the 
company network against invisible attacks, the specific commands are 
generated, which are detected by the company NIDP system as shown in 
Figure 4.5. The results achieved in Scenario-1 show that, by creating a rule 
in the NIDP system, a network can be secured against invisible attacks.  
4.3.2.2 Scenario II 
It is crucial to ascertain the risks and points of vulnerability in computer 
systems. However, it is also important to estimate the risk quantitatively 
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associated with the company network. For this purpose, OWASP risk rating 
methodology is employed to assess the security risk level of company Sales 
department against invisible attacks. The reason for selecting OWASP tool is 
its simplicity and capability to address the challenges faced by web 
application security in a better way. Due to its features, it is widely used by 
designers, developers, code reviewers, and the quality assurance team. 
In this scenario, the attacker gets advantages of company’s invisible 
vulnerabilities (usernames and passwords) by generating invisible attacks 
using Google advanced search engine and retrieves company’s confidential 
information. The standard risk model is particularly involved into 4 steps, 
described as follows.  
 Step-I: Identification of risk 
In risk assessment, the first and foremost step is the identification that needs 
to be rated. For this purpose, a network administrator collects information 
regarding threat agents, vulnerabilities, attacks and their impacts on 
organization. In our specific case, the threat agents are particularly 
competitors interested in stealing company’s Sales information. Usernames 
and passwords are the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by threat agents 
to achieve their targets, whereas, Google dorks are the threats.  
 Step-II: Factors for estimating likelihood 
Factors involved in estimating likelihood are further classified into two 
categories: 1) Threat agent factors, and 2) Vulnerability factors. Let A(L) 
represents the option in the likelihood factors, where “A” shows the particular 
attribute and “L” describes its level. 
  
67 
 
 
1. Threat agent factors 
The term threat agent can be used to specify a single attacker or a group of 
attackers that actually generates attacks. The factors involved in the context 
of threat agents to estimate the probability of a successful attack are skill 
level, motivation level, opportunity and size of the threat agent.  
 Skill level  
Skill level specifies the attacker’s capability to exploit the weaknesses of the 
system. Different options listed for threat agent’s skills are given below.  
 No technical skills (1) 
 Some technical skills (3) 
 Advanced computer user (4) 
 Network and programming skills (6) 
 Security penetration skills (9) 
In this particular scenario, “Some technical skills” is a better option to focus 
on because it does not require any penetration, programming or advanced 
skill to retrieve vulnerability of the network.   
 Motive 
Motive refers to the level of interest of threat agents exploiting the 
weaknesses of the network system.   
 Low or no reward (1) 
 Possible reward (4) 
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 High reward (9) 
It is a good option to select “Possible reward (4)” because normally threat 
agents make query about company information during exploration.  This is 
an information gathering stage and the recorded information is then used for 
estimating the value associated with the possible attack on the company. 
Since, the company under consideration was not secure; therefore, the 
gathered information could be utilized to access systems having company 
financial data and its resources.  
 Opportunity 
Opportunity outlines the resources required for attacker to manipulate and 
exploit the vulnerable components of the network. 
 Full access or expensive resources required (0) 
 Special access or resources required (4) 
 Some access or resources required (7) 
 No access or resources required (9) 
“Some access or resources required (7)” is a good choice to select from the 
given choices since the threat agent only needs to evaluate the invisible 
attacks by exploiting time, Internet and proper Google dork commands.  
 Population size 
The population size refers to the number of people involved in generating the 
attack as well as exploiting the vulnerability of the system.  
 Systems administrators (2) 
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 Intranet users (4) 
 Partners (5) 
 Authenticated users (6) 
 Anonymous Internet users (9) 
“Anonymous Internet user (9)” is a better option to focus on because severity 
risk assessment is associated to the Internet especially from outside the 
network. Note that the remaining options are for the legitimate users of the 
organization.  
2. Vulnerability Factors 
The purpose of this factor is to predict the likelihood of discovering and 
exploiting specific system vulnerabilities. It is assumed that the attacker has 
sufficient knowledge to use Google dork operators and knows how to create 
a command from these operators in order to query specific vulnerabilities. 
The factors that affect the discovery and exploitation of system vulnerability 
are given below. 
 Ease of discovery 
Different vulnerabilities have different discovery levels depending upon the 
attacker’s skill and the tools necessary to create potions. Following are the 
various options used to determine how easy to discover a vulnerability.  
 Not applicable (0) 
 Practically impossible (1) 
 Difficult (3) 
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 Easy (7) 
 Automated tools available (9) 
It is good to select option “Easy (7)” because it is easy to discover 
vulnerability by Google dork operators and there is no need to use any other 
tool or sophisticated skills. 
 Ease of Exploit 
Having discovered the vulnerability, there is a need to measure how easy to 
utilize it in order to compromise the system. 
 Not applicable (0)  
 Theoretical (1) 
 Difficult (3) 
 Easy (5) 
 Automated tools available (9) 
Since the information discovered during the experiment is very sensitive and 
can be utilized by threat agents to gain access to different company network 
resources easily, therefore, “Easy (5)” is a good option to select from the 
given options. 
 Awareness 
This factor describes how much familiar the attacker is with the vulnerability. 
 Not applicable (0) 
 Unknown (1) 
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 Hidden (4) 
 Obvious (6) 
 Public knowledge (9) 
The option “Hidden (4)” is selected because vulnerability discovered through 
Google dorks is an invisible form of attack, i.e. the vulnerability is hidden to 
the attacker.  
 Intrusion detection 
This factor measures intrusion due to exploitation of vulnerability by the 
system security countermeasures.  
 Not applicable (0) 
 Active detection in application (1) 
 Logged and reviewed (3) 
 Logged without review (8) 
 Not logged (9) 
The system security countermeasures log the query as it is viewed as normal 
traffic. The logs are not marked for review, which implies that no intrusion will 
be detected. Since the information discovered is legitimate, therefore, the 
invisible attack is seen as normal traffic. 
Now, all these options selected from Threat Agent Factors and Vulnerability 
Factors are summarized in Table 4.3. 
  
72 
 
 
Table 4.3: Likelihood Factors. 
 
 Step-III: Factors for estimating Impact 
When vulnerabilities are exploited, the company network as well as its 
resources is compromised. This affect can range from low level to the high 
level, for example shutting down the business. There is a need to measure 
the impact of attack on the company network. This impact can either be on 
the technical level or on the whole business. Now, we discuss and measure 
these factors based on the case study. Assume that A(L) is the option in the 
impact factors, where “A” shows the particular attribute and “L” describes its 
level. 
1. Technical Impact Factors 
Threat Agent Factors 
Skills required Some technical skills (3) 
Motive Possible reward (4) 
Opportunity Some access or resources required (7) 
Population size Anonymous Internet users (9) 
Vulnerability Factors 
Easy of discovery Easy (7) 
Ease of exploit Easy (5) 
Awareness Hidden (4) 
Intrusion detection Logged without review (8) 
  
73 
 
 
This impact factor describes the effects of attack on the company network 
and its resources.  Based on the security properties, these impact factors are 
classified into confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability.  
 Loss of confidentiality 
The term loss of confidentiality assesses the amount of data that can 
possibly be disclosed by invisible vulnerability. 
 Not applicable (0)  
 Minimal non-sensitive data disclosed (2) 
 Extensive non-sensitive data disclosed (6) 
 Extensive critical data disclosed (7) 
 All data disclosed (9) 
The data disclosed in the case study contains sensitive information such as 
usernames and passwords that can be used to access both the company 
network and data systems.  
 Loss of integrity 
The loss of integrity refers to assess the amount of data that can possibly be 
corrupted or damaged in case of a successful attack. 
 Not applicable (0) 
 Minimal slightly corrupt data (1) 
 Minimal seriously corrupt data (3) 
 Extensive slightly corrupt data (5) 
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 Extensive seriously corrupt data (7) 
 All data totally corrupt (9) 
During analysis, it was found that the retrieved information contained logins 
with high privileges, which could be used to access any network resource in 
the Sales department as well as could be altered leading to corrupting entire 
department data. Since the financial software used in the Sales department 
has a chain reaction, i.e. a change in one instance can lead to the change in 
another instance; therefore, all the other systems in the department can be 
affected. 
 Loss of availability 
Loss of availability assesses how the exploitation of vulnerability can impact 
the network services availability. In this regard, the following question can 
arise: 
o Will the attack lead to the network down? 
o Will there be any disruption in service due the attack and how critical 
will be the impact of services on the functionality of the network? 
To answer the above-mentioned questions, one of the following options can 
help to quantify the impact of loss of availability on network.    
 Not applicable (0) 
 Minimal secondary services interrupted (1) 
 Minimal primary services interrupted (5) 
 Extensive secondary services interrupted (7) 
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 All services completely lost (9) 
Since the information retrieved is from the Sales department, therefore, 
accessed login details will pose no effect on the network services. However, 
it is worth mentioning that this information can be used as a stepping stone 
to gain more access to the network in order to disrupt network services. 
 Loss of accountability 
Once the attack is successful, this factor helps in quantifying how security 
countermeasures can be used efficiently to track the changes and also trace 
them back to the point of exploitation. 
 Attack fully traceable to individual (1) 
 Attack possible traceable to individual (7) 
 Attack completely anonymous (9) 
It is better choice to select “attack possible traceable to individual (7)” 
because security countermeasures can trace the changes of user login used 
by the attacker. Since, the information like user logins and passwords has 
already been disclosed by the attacker, so the legitimate user will not be 
accountable for the misuse of the account. However, it is possible to trace 
the account but it is difficult to trace the individual generated the attack. 
2. Business Impact Factors 
The business impact comes from technical impact requiring a good 
understanding of what is important to the company from application point of 
view. These impact factors are the common areas for various organizations 
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and these areas are particularly more unique to a company than the factors 
associated with threat agent, vulnerability, and technical impact. Some 
details of each of these factors along with their respective options are given 
below.  
 Financial damage 
This factor measures the financial impact of the attack. This can cause 
decrement in annual profit, loss of major accounts, and in some cases the 
organization can become bankrupt. 
 Not applicable (0) 
 Damage cost less than to fix the issue (1) 
 Minor effect on annual profit (3) 
 Significant effect on annual profit (7) 
 Bankruptcy (9) 
Using worst case scenario, the attacker is assumed to have access to 
financial reports and financial systems, then, it will be easy for the attacker to 
mislead the Sales department and thus making the business bankrupted.     
 Reputation damage 
This factor affects the company name and its stakeholders. It also causes 
loss of major clients as well as goodwill. 
 Not applicable (0) 
 Minimal damage (1), 
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 Loss of major accounts (4) 
 Loss of goodwill (5) 
 Brand damage (9) 
The selected option is “brand damage (9)”, because once the company has 
been declared a compromised; it will be difficult for it to attain the client trust 
again. 
 Non-compliance 
How much exposure does non-compliance introduce? 
 Not applicable (0) 
 Minor violation (2) 
 Clear violation (5) 
 High profile violation (7) 
High profile violation is a better choice to select for this scenario.  
 Privacy violation 
This factor has a number of effects, for example, loss of sensitive personal 
information may result in identity protection violation. The loss of 
commercially sensitive information may lead to legal liabilities.   
 Not applicable (0) 
 One individual (3) 
 Hundreds of people (5) 
 Thousands of people (7) 
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 Millions of people (9) 
Since, the company under consideration is a small enterprise so the 
information disclosed is of hundreds of people. Bigger companies will have 
bigger exposure.  
Now, all these selected options from Technical Impact Factors and Business 
Impact Factors are summarized in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Impact Factors. 
Technical Impact Factors 
Loss of confidentiality Extensive critical data disclosed (7) 
Loss of Integrity All data totally corrupt (9) 
Loss of Availability Not applicable (0) 
Loss of Accountability Attack possible traceable to individual (7) 
Business Impact Factors 
Financial damage Bankruptcy (9) 
Reputation damage Brand damage (9) 
Non-compliance High profile violation (7) 
Privacy violation Hundreds of people (5) 
 
 Step-IV: Determining the severity of the risk 
The level from 0 to 9 is further divided into three sublevels: 0-3, 3-6 and 6-9 
representing low, medium and high level respectively as given in Table 4.5. 
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The overall severity risk level is calculated based on the likelihood and 
impact estimates using the security risk assessment Table 4.6. These risk 
levels may be low, medium, high or critical. 
Table 4.5: Likelihood and Impact levels. 
[0, 3) Low 
[3, 6) Medium 
[6, 9) High 
 
Table 4.6; Overall severity risk level of invisible attack. 
 Impacts 
Likelihood Low Medium High 
Low  Note Low Medium 
Medium Low Medium High 
High Medium High Critical 
 
Finally, the overall risk severity level of the invisible attack on Sales 
department is calculated as follows. Let 𝑛𝐿 and 𝑛𝐼 represent the total number 
of options, selected from likelihood and impact factors respectively, 𝐴𝐿(𝐿) 
and 𝐴𝐼(𝐿) denote the respective level values of the particular options being 
selected as better choices from likelihood and impact factors.  𝐿𝑆 and 𝐼𝑆 
represent the likelihood and impact scores respectively, are defined as:   
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𝐿𝑆 =
1
𝑛𝐿
∑ 𝐴𝐿(𝐿)
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
                                                                                                            (4.1) 
𝐼𝑆 =
1
𝑛𝐼
∑ 𝐴𝐼(𝐿)
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
                                                                                                             (4.2) 
Using Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, after plugging the values in equations (4.1) 
and (4.2), we come up with: 
𝐿𝑆 =
1
8
(3 + 4 + 7 + 9 + 7 + 5 + 4 + 8) =  5.87                                                      (4.3) 
𝐼𝑆 =
1
8
(7 + 9 + 0 + 7 + 9 + 9 + 7 + 5) =  6.62                                                      (4.4) 
Since, 𝐿𝑆 ∈ [3, 6) and 𝐼𝑆 ∈ [6, 9), which implies that likelihood score has a 
medium risk severity level, whereas, impact score possesses a high risk 
severity level. Now, using security risk assessment Table 4.6, the 
corresponding risk severity level for 
{(medium, high), medium ∈ likelihoodandhigh ∈ impact} is high. Therefore, in 
the light of the above analysis, it can be concluded that the overall risk 
severity level on Sales department of UK based company caused by invisible 
attack is high.   
4.4 Conclusion 
The overview of different types of attacks with respect to their visibility to 
security countermeasures has been discussed and concept of invisible 
attacks based on literature and experimental studies was elaborated in this 
chapter. The Google dorks as the invisible attacks were tested by 
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considering a UK based company as a case study. The results of this study 
will be helpful in these ways: 
 To design methods for countermeasures against security attacks and 
mitigation purpose.  
 To define the priority attached to the rule written in the NIDP systems 
based on the impact of the attack.  
These two contributions can help the network management team to build 
more secure networks especially against the invisible attack. 
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Chapter 5.  
NIDS RISK ASSESSMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
There is increasing concern amongst computer security communities about 
the rising number of malicious attacks. Firewalls and intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) are the main components widely used to counter security 
threats. Implementing firewalls in a network is considered a major deterrent 
to network threats.  Despite the protective mechanism, a firewall does not 
provide full protection against data leakage and, hidden and multithread 
attacks. However, to be protected from these attacks and to have a more 
secure network against unwanted malicious traffic, sophisticated intrusion 
detection/prevention tools are required.  The tools termed as IDS analyze the 
traffic in depth and decide whether the traffic is normal (friendly) or malicious 
(hostile). If the traffic is hostile, the system generates alerts. The IDS have 
been proved quite effective and with the increasing number of threats, 
majority of network communities have been investigating how to produce a 
more effective network intrusion detection and prevention (NIDP) system.  
The main problem with the current NIDP systems is that they lose packets in 
case of high traffic volumes. This affects the assessment of risk security 
levels of the organization. Therefore, packet loss is one of the significant 
problems faced by the networking teams today. To increase the security of a 
network, there is a need to evaluate the performance of existing NIDP 
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systems. Assessing the security risk level of malicious traffic running in a 
network is also another major problem which needs a special attention. 
Currently deployed NIDP systems show the qualitative risk level of attacks in 
terms of high, medium, low and very low. These fuzzy measures are not 
enough to describe the security risk level of a network. There must be a 
quantitative metrics which shows the security risk level produced by attacks 
based on absolute value.  
This chapter is divided into two scenarios. Scenario-1 employs the 
performance evaluation comparisons in terms of packet handling capability 
of two NIDS tools, Snort and Suricata under three different platforms (Linux, 
FreeBSD and ESXi server). The proposed and designed methodology is 
performed on a specifically designed test bench to replicate busy enterprise 
network traffic. Scenario-2 describes how the security risk level of attacks in 
the presence of NIDP system is assessed. The following experiments will 
help network administrators to: 
 Choose the most suitable NIDP system for their network in terms of 
packet handling capability; 
 Quantitatively assess the security risk level of a network by creating 
NIDS security metric based on best traffic speed used for analysing 
network traffic.  
5.2 Snort Overview 
Snort is a well-known name in the information security community. It was 
developed by Martin Roesch in 1998 [84]. It is an open source NIDP system 
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that combines the benefits of signature, protocol, and anomaly based 
inspection to detect hostile traffic. It is capable of performing packet logging 
and real-time traffic analysis on the network [85]. Snort inspects packet 
header and performs protocol analysis. It monitors a range of network threats 
by using content/signature matching algorithms and logs the traffic on the 
network, and generates alerts against malicious events [86], [87]. The main 
function of Snort and other types of NIDP systems is to effectively analyse all 
the traffic passing through the network without any packet drops. Its 
architecture is usually composed of four components: packet sniffing, pre-
processor, detection engine and output device as shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1: Snort Architecture. 
In case of packet sniffing, Snort collects data from the network and displays it 
as it is on the screen in a TCP dump mode. It relies on libpcap and winpcap 
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libraries for packet acquisition, where Libpcap and winpcap are specific 
platforms used to receive traffic from the network. Packet acquisition 
monitors packet arriving time and calculates total length of the packet, and 
also checks interface link type on which the packet was captured. Snort 
processes single packet at a time and if there is a vast volume of traffic on 
the network, it takes a little longer to handle that traffic. The buffering system 
is a major limitation in Snort as it drops excess packets causing some of the 
packets to bypass the detection engine which leads to compromising the 
network. The second step of packet processing is packet decoding, in which 
decoders examine the link layer and try to find out the layer used for packet 
fetching. Snort can be configured by different links such as Token, Ring, Bus, 
FDDI, Cisco, SLIP and Point to Point, etc. With the help of pcap files, Snort 
analyses the traffic on each link layer and if it finds any malicious packet, it 
begins to make a queue for that traffic. Packet decoding in Snort is 
straightforward especially for an Ethernet link. At TCP packet decoding, 
Snort makes the structure of packets and sends them towards the protocol 
decoder [88]. After decoding, it forwards these packets towards pre-
processor for performing various operations like examining protocols and 
their behaviour for anomaly-based detection. All the information going to pre-
processor must pass through the protocol decoder. The main pre-processors 
in Snort are packet defragmentation, Stateful inspection session and 
application layer. A pre-processor is basically a program used to normalize 
the raw packets and checks them against anomaly-based behaviour, for 
example HTTP plug-in manages the application at traffic flow time and also 
avoids unwanted traffic processing that can cause an overload on the 
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network. The output of Snort pre-processor becomes the input of the 
detection engine. Some of the basic functions of the pre-processors are 
protocol normalization, anomaly-based detection (non-rule based detection) 
and statistics-based detection. In case of TCP, the pre-processor divides 
data into smaller frames of datagram and sends them to the destination by 
labelling them with unique identifiers [88]. On the destination, all these 
fragmented datagrams are reassembled. If any of the sequence numbers in 
a datagram reassembling is missing, TCP again sends the datagram frame 
to the destination until it receives a positive acknowledgement from the 
destination. In the case of UDP, there is no retransmission because the 
destination does not send any acknowledgement.  
Detection engine is one of the key components of Snort which works 
differently to the pre-processor. Its basic purpose is to get data or packets 
from the pre-processor and matches the pattern of the received packet with 
the database of a certain set of rules. If pattern matches then it generates 
alerts against the malicious packet and stops working on that specific packet. 
Otherwise, Snort treats the packet as a normal traffic and does not generate 
any alert against it. The detection engine generates alerts or logs depending 
upon the rule, for example, if the rule is of low priority then there will be a low 
level alert. In NIDP system mode, the higher the traffic volume that Snort has 
to handle, the higher the number of packets drop. 
5.3 Overview Suricata 
Like Snort, Suricata is an open information security foundation (OISF) funded 
by the USA Department of Homeland Security's Directorate for Science and 
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Technology (HOST) program and the Navy's Space and Naval Warfare 
System Command Open Security Technology program [89]. It is also a rule 
based NIDP system that takes advantage of externally developed rule sets to 
monitor network traffic and provide alerts when suspicious events take place 
[27]. Like most IDSs, it is designed to fit within existing network security 
components. It works as a multithreaded engine and according to its 
creators, the objective of the Project Phase-1 was to have a distributable and 
functional NIDP system engine. On 1st January 2010, it was first made 
available for downloading for academic and non-commercial research 
purposes [89]. Its structure is written in C language and supports FreeBSD, 
Linux, UNIX, Mac OS platform. The source code for configuration file is 
written as a YAML file. In comparison with Snort, Suricata can process from 
one packet to tens of thousands/hundreds of thousands packets at a time. 
There is a trade-off between lower performance and less memory (RAM) or 
higher performance and more memory. In other words, memory usage 
increases, the performance decreases when Suricata processes huge 
number of packets [89]. 
After acquisitioning a packet, like Snort, Suricata decodes it and then 
forwards it to the pre-processor as shown in Figure 5.2. Since the packets 
received on a network are fragmented, therefore, defragmentation is applied 
to the packets before going to Suricata for further inspection. The 
defragmentation session contains prealloc, timeout and max-frag options. To 
save system resources, signatures are divided into four different categories: 
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default, high, medium and low. The detection engine is designed to provide 
the best balance of performance and memory usage.  
 
Figure 5.2: Suricata architecture. 
5.4 Test Bench 
The tests have been performed on a real network composed of high 
performance PCs used to generate desired traffic. The NIDP systems 
running Snort/Suricata and a ProCurve series 2900 switch is shown in Figure 
5.3. The PCs are connected via the switch using a 1.0 Gigabit cables and 
two 10 Gigabit cables. The port connecting the NIDP system to the network 
on the switch acts as a spanning port. Fixed numbers of packets are 
generated from source to destination for both NIDP systems. The packet size 
representing the amount of data is defined in the packet. The maximum data 
size for TCP and UDP connections is 65536 bytes and 65507 bytes 
respectively. The LAN traffic V2 enhanced tool is taken into account for 
generating traffic from source machines to destination machines.  
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Figure 5.3: Test bench. 
The NIDP systems used in this experiment are signature based IDSs 
containing built-in rules. It is important to note that the best IDS is not the one 
having the most rules (signatures) but the one that performs better in 
detecting attacks and avoids false positives irrespective of its internal 
architecture or behaviour. More rules mean additional chances to catch 
malicious traffic. The same numbers of rules, i.e. 8000 are loaded in the 
databases of both NIDP systems (Snort and Suricata) in all experiments. 
Now, in this experiment the main focus is the number of packets received, 
analysed and dropped by the NIDP systems. The readings are taken from 
the summary of NIDP systems after running for 1 minute, 5 minutes and 10 
minutes. The application's usage (CPU usage) is calculated from the system 
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task manager. The hardware specification of the network components is 
shown in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1: Network components specifications. 
Machine 
Type 
Hardware Specifications Tools used 
Windows 
SP2 
Dell Precision, T3400,Intel Quad-
core,Q6600,2GB Ram, 1Gbps 
network card 
LAN Traffic 
Generator 
FreeBSD 
Linux 2.6 
Dell Precision, T3400,Intel Quad-
core, Q6600,2GB Ram ,10Gbps 
network card 
Suricata, 
Snort 
Bandwidth monitor 
ESXi Server Dell Precision, T3400,Intel Quad-
core, Q6600,4GB Ram, 1Gbps 
network card (for monitoring 
server), 10Gb for IDS 
VMware ESXi 
Hypervisor 
Linux 2.6 
Suricata, 
Snort 
Bandwidth monitor 
Attacker Dell Precision, T3400,Intel Quad-
core, Q6600,2GB Ram , 1Gbps 
network card 
Backtrack Linux 
Metasploit 3 
Framework 
Network 
Switch 
ProCurve series 2900 
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5.4.1 Scenario-1 
Test scenarios-1 is designed to compare the performance of Suricata with 
Snort on different operating systems for different tasks. Both NIDP systems 
are subjected to the same tests under the same operating conditions. To 
attain more accuracy in results, all tasks are performed on packet sizes 512 
bytes, 1024 bytes and 1470 bytes for the different protocols with speeds 250 
Mbps, 500 Mbps, 750 Mbps, 1.0 Gpbs, 1.5 Gbps, and 2.0 Gbps. Both NIDP 
systems are configured to load and run a similar number of rules to monitor 
the traffic generated. The assessment of more reliable IDS on a busy 
network is achieved on the basis of number of packet drops. The following 
tasks will provide a clear view of the test scenario-1.  
Task A: Performance of NIDP systems on ESXi sever 
Most data centres use virtualization as a means of saving time and money. 
This is a common practice in the enterprise environment. To ensure the 
validity and accuracy of the experiments, both NIDP systems are operated in 
exactly the same environment and, to simulate an enterprise’s data centre, 
both tools are implemented on ESXi server [90]. Since, this is a performance 
assessment; the machines should be as identical as possible in terms of 
hardware to enable an accurate comparison. The ESXi server is equipped 
with 4GB RAM in which 2GB is allocated to the virtual Linux running inside 
the ESXi server. A network card is employed in the ESXi server to establish 
a connection from the management PC to the virtual host. 
Task B:  Performance of NIDP systems on Linux 2.6 
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In this task, Snort and Suricata are operated on a Linux 2.6 server running 
Ubuntu 10.10. The machine is configured to monitor traffic using 10 Gbps 
card. 
Task C:  Performance of NIDP systems on FreeBSD 
Snort and Suricata are operated on a FreeBSD server running the latest 
version 8.1, which is configured to operate with 10 Gbps network card. Both 
NIDP systems are operated separately on the same platforms allowing them 
to use all the available resources.  
5.4.1.1 Result and Analysis 
This section covers the results and analysis of the performance evaluation 
for both Snort and Suricata on the three different platforms. For clarity and 
understanding, this section is further divided into two subsections: TCP and 
UDP traffic. Each subsection delivers a performance comparison on a virtual 
machine, Linux 2.6 and FreeBSD with different packet sizes and speeds. 
 TCP 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the performance of both NIDP tools using packet size 
512 bytes. In this test, Suricata shows some packet drops in the early stages 
(250 Mbps), but on Virtual Linux, it reaches 35.4%, which is considered as 
high packet drops at a low traffic speed. It is also observed that Suricata has 
some small packet drops of 0.6% on FreeBSD and no packet drops on Linux 
2.6. This percentage of packet drops increases slightly when the speed goes 
to 500 Mbps. As shown in Figure 5.4, Snort performs very well as there are 
no packet drops recorded at 250 Mbps and 500 Mbps on all platforms. Once 
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the speed approaches to 750 Mbps, Snort drops 1.1% of the packets but it 
does not drop any packets for Linux 2.6 or FreeBSD system setup. 
 
Figure 5.4: Comparison chart of Snort and Suricata (512) TCP. 
At 1.0 Gbps, Suricata continues to drop packets (26.5% on Linux 2.6, 36.7% 
on FreeBSD and 47.2% on virtual Linux) while Snort performs better with 
only 2.8% and 0.6% packet drops for Linux 2.6 and virtual Linux respectively. 
At high speeds, Snort does not behave well with packets drops of upto 60% 
on Virtual Linux while Suricata gains ground with lower packet drops than 
Snort. From the results, it is clear that although the speed affects the number 
of packet drops for Snort, Suricata tends to consistently drop packets no 
matter the traffic speed. 
At packet size of 1024 bytes, the results compiled from the experiment are 
shown in Figure 5.5. Similar to the results achieved in the earlier test, 
Suricata drops packets for all traffic speeds when using the Virtual Linux 
platform and also shows low percentage packet drops for the other platforms 
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until the speed hits 750 Mbps. Snort, on the other hand exhibits good 
performance for the low speeds but drops a high percentage of packets 
(27.8%) at 1.5Gbps. 
 
Figure 5.5: Comparison chart of Snort and Suricata (1024) TCP. 
It is worth mentioning that the performance of Suricata on Linux2.6 at the 
speed of 750 Mbps is improved as the number of packet losses does not 
exceed 0.5% on Linux 2.6 and 6.4% on FreeBSD. Suricata records a high 
jump in the number of packet drops at 1.0 Gbps as it reaches 15.7% on 
Linux 2.6, 23% on FreeBSD and 46% on Virtual Linux. On the other hand, 
Snort only drops 0.7% on Linux 2.6, 0.56% on Virtual Linux and 0% on 
FreeBSD. Once the traffic speed approaches to 1.5 Gbps, there is a 
significant increase in the packet drops on Linux 2.6 as well as virtual Linux 
up to 27.8%. Suricata at this stage records 35% on Linux 2.6 and more than 
48% on Virtual Linux, whereas, Snort records only 11%. At 2.0 Gbps, there is 
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a clear difference in Snort’s performance on Virtual Linux as it drops more 
than 55% packets while the packet drop is only 11% at 1.5 Gbps. This shows 
that the platform used by the NIDP systems also determines its performance. 
 
Figure 5.6: Comparison chart of Snort and Suricata (1470) TCP. 
Figure 5.6 shows the performance of both systems when dealing with a 
larger packet size (1470 bytes). The performance in this test is quite similar 
to the previous one.  Suricata performs the same way with high packet drops 
observed when running in the Virtual Linux environment across all speeds, 
whereas, at the other platforms, it first exhibits the packet drops at 1.0 Gbps 
(6.86% and 13.1%), and this percentage of packet drops increases with 
increasing the speeds. Snort on the other hand, does not drop packets at all 
the platforms until the speed of 1.5 Gbps (1.68%). By analysing all three 
experiments carried out for the TCP packet sizes, it is clear that Snort shows 
a more predictable performance rate than Suricata. 
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 UDP 
Suricata records some packet drops at a low speed (250 Mbps) as shown in 
Figure 5.7. This packet drops is recorded when dealing with a packet size of 
512 bytes. Although, there is a large number of packet drops on virtual Linux 
and FreeBSD but there is no packet drop recorded on Linux. At this speed, 
Snort is performing well with no packet drops at all the platforms. 
 
Figure 5.7Comparison chart of Snort and Suricata (512) UDP. 
When the generated traffic approaches to speed 500 Mbps, Suricata again 
shows a high percentage of packet drops on FreeBSD and virtual Linux but 
there is a minor increase in the number of packet drops on the Linux 2.6 
platform. On the other hand, Snort is still performing better than Suricata, as 
no packet drops are recorded on Linux 2.6 and FreeBSD, and only 0.48% on 
virtual Linux. As can be seen from Figure 5.7, Snort makes a significant jump 
in the number of packet drops on Linux 2.6 and virtual Linux when the traffic 
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approaches to speed 750 Mbps. It is worth pointing out that Snort is proving 
to perform best on FreeBSD as no packet drops are recorded up to this 
speed. At 1.0 Gbps, Snort starts showing some packet loss on FreeBSD 
7.9%, and Suricata losses 45%. When the generated traffic reaches speed 
1.5 Gbps and above, Snort starts to drop a large number of packets 
exceeding 73%. 
 
Figure 5.8: Comparison chart of Snort and Suricata (1024) UDP. 
At the packet size of 1024 bytes, Snort is still ahead of Suricata in terms of 
performance as shown in Figure 5.8. Snort does not record any packet 
losses at the speeds of 250 Mbps and 500 Mbps on Linux 2.6 and FreeBSD, 
and just 0.1% on virtual Linux. On the other hand, Suricata shows a large 
number of packet drops as it reaches 40.2% on FreeBSD and 33.9% on 
virtual Linux. It does not record any packet losses on Linux 2.6 at the same 
speeds. Suricata’s performance at the speeds of 250 Mbps, 500 Mbps and 
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750 Mbps is acceptable as it does not exceed 0.33%. The overall 
performance of Snort at the speed 750 Mbps is significantly better on the 
virtual machine and FreeBSD as it only records 1.2% packet drops. At higher 
speeds (1.0 Gbps), the best performance is achieved on FreeBSD with only 
3.24 % packet drops, whereas the best performance for Suricata is on Linux 
2.6 at 8.9%. At the speeds of 1.5 Gbps and 2.0 Gbps, both IDSs drop a large 
number of packets. 
 
Figure 5.9: Comparison chart of Snort and Suricata (1470) UDP. 
Now, from Figure 5.9, Snort percentage of packet drops is noticeable. It can 
be said that Snort is capable of handling packets of size 1470 bytes 
effectively than Suricata. Snort starts to drop packets at the high speed of 1.0 
Gbps on virtual Linux but does not exceed 1.15% at the speed of 2.0 Gbps. 
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5.4.1.2 Summary of Analysis 
Scenario-1 focused on comparing the effectiveness of the new NIDP 
systems Suricata with the well-known NIDP system, Snort, in a high speed 
network environment to determine the best NIDP system. Both NIDP 
systems were evaluated on different platforms with different protocols and 
packet sizes. The results show that there is a significant numbers of packet 
drops when using virtualization, where the allocated physical memory (RAM) 
of host machine is actually allocated to virtual RAM and disk space [91]. Due 
to this characteristic, the number of packet received by the network card is 
higher than the recorded by the virtual machine leading to more packet 
drops. It is also observed that in some cases, Snort drops more packets in 
Linux 2.6 than in a virtual Linux, whereas, the same is not true with Suricata. 
Finally, it can be stated that Suricata performs well on Linux 2.6 as compared 
to FreeBSD and virtual Linux but fails to match Snort. Moreover, Suricata 
has a lower performance rate as compared to Snort despite having a multi-
packet handling capability.  
5.4.2 Scenario-2 
The NIDP system can be implemented in either inside or outside the local 
network of organization. This decision is particularly made by the 
organization’s network administrator depending upon security mechanisms. 
Regardless of how the sensor is placed, the NIDP system can provide a 
significant view into traffic crossing the network. The main objective of any 
NIDP system is to perform in-depth analysis of the traffic passing through the 
network and the achieved results can be helpful to any network administrator 
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to evaluate the network security state by reviewing the logs that show alerts 
of the intrusion attempts. On any given network, on any given day, NIDP 
system can fire thousands of alerts which make a challenging task for a 
network administrator to analyse all the data. For this purpose, metrics are 
considered as a valuable approach for network administrators to assess the 
security level of their networks.  
Metrics has been used in many facets of a person's life especially in decision 
making process. The important questions related to network can be 
answered by these metrics, such as, is the network security level increasing 
or decreasing? Is NIDP system alarming on the correct events? which event 
should a network administrator focus on, etc. In order to create metrics, it is 
necessary for network administrator to determine that NIDP system is 
working as intended. Current NIDP systems like Snort has the capability to 
classify the alerts of impact of attacks in terms of high, medium, low and very 
low using common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS). To assess the 
security risk level of a network, these fuzzy values are not sufficient 
especially to analyse the network status in terms of attacks. Therefore, there 
is a need of new NIDP system security risk metrics, which should describe 
the network status in terms of the absolute value based on the alerts 
generated by NIDP systems quarterly, fortnightly or every day. Due to its 
good performance, Snort NIDP system is selected to assess the security risk 
level by analysing the number of alerts generated at traffic speeds 250Mbps, 
500 Mbps, 750 Mbps, 1.0 Gbps, 1.5 Gbps and 2.0 Gbps for the designed 
test bench shown in Figure 5.3. For achieving consistency in the experiment, 
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the same number of rules (8,000) used in scenario-1 is applied to Scenario-
2. Metasploit tool is used to generate malicious traffic from different nodes to 
the targeted NIDP system. Further, it is important to note that Linux OS is 
employed as NIDP systems perform well on it as observed from Scenario-1.  
5.4.2.1 Attack Detection Rate (Alerts) 
In order to see the effectiveness of Snort for different traffic speeds, a 
scenario is created with Metasploit tool generating malicious traffic towards 
the NIDP system. The results achieved in this analysis are given in Table 
5.2. 
Table 5.2: Snort behavior at different traffic speed. 
Traffic Speed 
(per second) 
Packet 
Analysed (%) 
Packet 
Dropped (%) 
Alerts generated 
by Snort (%) 
250 Mb 100 0 100 
500 Mb 100 0 100 
750 Mb 100 0 100 
1.0 Gb 100 0 100 
1.5 Gb 100 0 100 
2.0 Gb 86.4 13.6 99.7 
 
It is clear from Table 5.2, Snort detects all the attacks until the speed 
reaches 1.5 Gbps. After this speed, 13.6% of the packets are dropped and, 
there is 0.3% inefficiency recorded in alert generation. This leads to defining 
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a threshold traffic speed for this scenario. It is also noted that Snort is 
capable to analyse all the packets and to generate alerts up to speed 1.5 
Gbps. All the generated alerts are classified in terms of high, medium, low 
and very low severity levels using CVSS as given in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: Classification of attacks defined in the Snort rule. 
No Class type Description No. of Alerts 
received 
Priority 
A1 Attempted-admin Attempted Administrator 
Privilege Gain 
229 High 
A2 Attempted-user Attempted User 
Privilege Gain 
3 High 
A3 Inappropriate-
content 
Inappropriate content 
was detected 
0 - 
A4 Policy-violation Potential Corporate 
Privacy Violation 
0 - 
A5 Shellcode-detect Executable code was 
detected 
22 High 
A6 Successful-admin Successful 
Administrator Privilege 
Gain 
0 - 
A7 Successful-user Successful User 
Privilege Gain 
0 - 
A8 Trojan-activity A Network Trojan was 2 High 
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detected 
A9 Unsuccessful-user Unsuccessful User 
Privilege Gain 
0 - 
A10 Web-application 
attack 
Web Application attack 58 High 
A11 Attempted-dos Attempted Denial of 
Service 
141 Medium 
A12 Attempted-recon Attempted Information 
Leak 
443 Medium 
A13 Bad-unknown Potentially Bad Traffic 0 - 
A14 Default-login 
attempt 
Attempt to login by a 
default username and 
password 
1 Medium 
A15 denial-of-service Detection of a Denial of 
Service Attack 
0 - 
A16 Misc-attack Misc Attack 6 Medium 
A17 Non-standard-
protocol 
Detection of a non-
standard protocol or 
event 
1607 Medium 
A18 rpc-portmap-
decode 
Decode of an RPC 
Query 
0 - 
A19 Successful-dos Denial of Service 0 - 
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A20 Successful-recon 
large scale 
Large Scale Information 
Leak 
0 - 
A21 Successful-recon 
limited 
Information Leak 2206 Medium 
A22 Suspicious-
filename-detect 
A suspicious filename 
was detected 
0 - 
A23 Suspicious-login An attempted login 
using a suspicious 
username was detected 
0 - 
A24 System-call-detect A system call was 
detected 
0 - 
A25 Unusual-client-
port-connection 
A client was using an 
unusual port 
0 - 
A26 Web-application 
activity 
Access to a potentially 
vulnerable web 
application  
18 
 
Medium 
A27 Icmp-event Generic ICMP event 0 - 
A28 Misc-activity Misc Activity 20 Low 
A29 Network-scan Denial of a network 
Scan 
0 - 
A30 Not-suspicious Not Suspicious Traffic 0 - 
A31 Protocol- Generic Protocol 0 - 
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command-decode Command Decode 
A32 String-detect A suspicious string was 
detected 
0 - 
A33 Unknown Unknown Traffic 0 - 
A34 Tcp-connection A TCP connection was 
detected 
0 - 
 
Now we are in a position to assess the security level of any organization by 
creating metrics based on the alerts to be generated by Snort. For this 
purpose, a total of 4756 alerts are generated against malicious traffic as 
shown in Figure 5.10.   
 
Figure 5.10: Total number of alerts based on attack impact. 
From these alerts, 314 alerts belong to high priority, 4422 alerts having 
medium priority and the remaining 20 alerts are of low priority. There is no 
alerts of type very low priority (For detail, please see Appendix C). Since, the 
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information provided by alerts is of qualitative nature and therefore, it is not 
sufficient to determine the security level of a network whether it is improving 
or deteriorating. In this regard, security metrics can provide a better picture to 
a network administrator in assessing the security level quantitatively. 
5.4.2.2 Evaluation Results 
For assessing the quantitative security risk level of a network in terms of 
absolute value, the experimental study was carried out. Tests were 
conducted at various traffic speeds up to 1.5 Gbps using the test bench 
shown in Figure 5.3. The security level of a network is evaluated on the basis 
of two measured values: 1) different types of attack occurrences and 2) 
impacts of attack.  
Case-1: Security level (𝑆𝐿) based on different types of attack occurrences 
As can be seen in Table 5.3, the attacks are classified into 34 different 
categories on the basis of class types derived from the rules, where each 
class type is listed along with its description. The number of received alerts 
against each attack category is also specified in it. Assuming 𝐴𝑖, where 𝑖 ∈ ℤ 
and 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 34 is the ithattack generated against the network, and 𝑆𝐿(𝐴𝑖) is 
the security level of a network due to 𝐴𝑖 attack. Now, security level of a 
network based on type of attack is determined by the following expression:  
𝑆𝐿(𝐴𝑖) =  
𝛼𝑖
∑ 𝛼
                                                                                                          (5.1) 
Where 𝛼𝑖 denotes the number of alerts generated against 𝐴𝑖 and ∑ 𝛼 is the 
total number of received alerts against ∀𝐴𝑖. Now using Table 5.3, 𝑆𝐿(. ) are 
evaluated as  
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𝑆𝐿(𝐴1) =  
𝛼1
∑ 𝛼
=  
229
4756
= 4.8%                                                                         (5.2) 
𝑆𝐿(𝐴2) =  
𝛼2
∑ 𝛼
=  
3
4756
= 0.06%                                                                       (5.3) 
Similarly,𝑆𝐿(𝐴3), 𝑆𝐿(𝐴4), . . ., 𝑆𝐿(𝐴34) are estimated, and are listed in Table 
5.4.  
Table 5.4: The security level of a network based on different types of attack 
occurrences. 
𝑆𝐿 (Ai) 
SL (A1) = 4.8% SL (A2) = 
0.06% 
SL (A3) = 0 SL (A4) = 0 SL (A5) = 0.5% 
SL (A6) = 0 SL (A7) = 0 SL (A8) = 
0.04% 
SL (A9) = 0 SL (A10) = 1.2% 
SL (A11) = 3% SL (A12) = 
9.3% 
SL (A13) = 0 SL (A14) = 
0.02% 
SL (A15) = 0 
SL (A16) = 
0.13% 
SL (A17) = 
34% 
SL (A18) = 0 SL (A19) = 0 SL (A20) = 0  
SL (A21) = 
46.4% 
SL (A22) = 0 SL (A23) = 0 SL (A24) = 0 SL (A25) = 0 
SL (A26) = 0.4% SL (A27) = 0 SL (A28) = 0.4%  SL (A29) = 0 SL (A30) = 0 
SL (A31) = 0 SL (A32) = 0 SL (A33) = 0 SL (A34) = 0  
The security level of a network due to attack 𝐴1is 4.8% as given by 
equation(5.2), which indicates that network is 95.2% secure against this 
attack. The security level due to attack 𝐴2 is 0.06%, which implies that the 
network is 99.4% secure enough. Now consider the worst case, the security 
level is highest, i.e. 46.4% with respect to attack 𝐴21 as clear from Table 5.4. 
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It means that network is just 53.6% secure and sufficient countermeasures 
are required to mitigate the potential risks from it. 
Case-2: Security level (𝑆𝐿) based on impact of attacks 
For simplicity, let ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚, 𝑙𝑜𝑤 and 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑤 impacts of attack are 
represented by 𝐻, 𝑀, 𝐿 and 𝑉 respectively. It is important to note that these 
impacts or alerts are generated by Snort. As shown in Figure 5.10, ∑ 𝐻 =
314, ∑ 𝑀 = 4422, ∑ 𝐿 = 20 and ∑ 𝑉 = 0, as no alert is generated of this 
category.  Suppose, ∑ 𝐻 + ∑ 𝑀 + ∑ 𝐿 + ∑ 𝑉 = 𝑆. Now, security level (𝑆𝐿) of a 
network based on impact is determined by the following expression:  
𝑆𝐿(𝐼𝑚) =
∑ 𝐼𝑚
𝑆
                                                                                                                (5.4) 
Where 𝐼𝑚 denotes the particular impact category, ∑ 𝐼𝑚 total alerts of 𝐼𝑚 
category, and 𝑆 represents the total alerts of all impact categories. Now, 
plugging in the above values, the security levels of network against 
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚, 𝑙𝑜𝑤 and 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑤 impacts of attack are as follows: 
𝑆𝐿(𝐻) =
∑ 𝐻
𝑆
=
314
4756
= 6%                                                                                       (5.5) 
𝑆𝐿(𝑀) =
∑ 𝑀
𝑆
=
4422
4756
= 93%                                                                                   (5.6) 
𝑆𝐿(𝐿) =
∑ 𝐿
𝑆
=
20
4756
= 0.42%                                                                                   (5.7) 
𝑆𝐿(𝑉) =
∑ 𝑉
𝑆
= 0%            ∵    ∑ 𝑉 = 0                                                                 (5.8) 
From equations 5.5-5.8, it is clear that security level of a network with 
respect to ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ impact is 6%, which implies that network is 94% secure 
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enough against this impact. The security level against 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 impact of 
attack is 93%, which shows that network is just 7% secure and therefore, 
appropriate countermeasures need to be employed to secure it. The security 
level due to 𝑙𝑜𝑤 impact is 0.42%, 𝑖. 𝑒.  (< 1%), which indicates that network is 
99% secure. However, it is not almost fully secure. Now, with respect to 
𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑤 impact of attack, the security level is zero. It means that the 
network is fully secure and, consequently, there are no threats of having 
𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑤 impact level.    
5.4.2.3 Summary of Analysis 
Based on performance, Snort NIDP system was employed to assess the 
security level of a network by analysing the alerts generated at various traffic 
speeds on the designed test bench. The security level was evaluated on the 
basis of different types of attack and the impacts of attack. The achieved 
security metrics describe the network status in terms of the absolute value 
which can help the network administrators in measuring the impact as well 
as the risk associated with each individual attack category. 
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Chapter 6.  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In large organizations, network security has become a critical subject due to 
the frequent increase in their sizes and complexity. Since cybercrime has 
been commercialised, the tremendous amount of network resources in the 
enterprise environment provides a big pull for malicious attacks. The network 
security risk associated with each attack is directly proportional to how 
malicious the attack is. A successful attack on the network is defined by the 
ability to exploit the network vulnerabilities in order to compromise and 
intrude the network resources. In a small network, intrusion can be prevented 
using ordinary scanning tools, for example, firewalls and antivirus which only 
provide a snapshot of the system configuration and vulnerabilities at one 
time. Consequently, these tools are not appropriate to measure the security 
of enterprise networks. To accomplish this task at enterprise level, network 
intrusion detection and prevention (NIDP) systems are introduced for 
securing the network.    
At present, the security community’s major concern is to answer questions 
related to the vulnerability of a network or system. Some of the topics of 
interest are hardening network security with less effort, resources involved in 
a particular network, relationships among these resources and techniques 
used to achieve a specific target. All these efforts are utilised in securing a 
network but a little effort has been made towards measuring the overall 
security level of the enterprise network quantitatively. The objective of this 
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research is to provide a quantitative solution to the question regarding the 
overall security level of an organization. Some of the existing research is 
supported to answer this question by using the attack graph method that 
provides a way of measuring the risk associated with a successful 
exploitation of a combination of vulnerabilities. However, it does not give an 
absolute value. A metric providing an absolute value would help the network 
security teams in organizations in measuring the security of the network by 
several ways such as: they would be able to tell how an introduced 
application or software affects the security of the network as well as they 
would be able to measure how often affects the security of the same 
organization. The metric designed in this study can help the network security 
teams to answer such questions.  Although the metric does not account for 
the human factor, rather, it uses the system vulnerabilities to give an 
absolute value of the network security risk assessment factor associated with 
cyber-attacks. In order to develop this metric, this work is focused on one of 
the major concerns, i.e. “How do we measure how secure the organizational 
network is from cyber-attacks?” This question has been broken down into 
smaller topics that can be exhaustively explored. Different types of 
vulnerabilities are explored and various types of cyber-attacks have been 
studied.    
A UK based company was considered as a case study in the experiments 
carried out for both the known vulnerabilities and invisible attacks. Based on 
the results achieved from known vulnerabilities, a framework for the metrics 
was designed. For invisible attacks, the experiment was carried out to show 
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how these attacks were detected and mitigated. As different types of invisible 
attacks exist, this work is particularly focused on the impact of Google dorks.  
The results obtained from the effects of the invisible attacks were used for 
designing the rule, which then employed in the NIDP systems as a mitigation 
method. The metrics achieved from this case study can be applicable to any 
enterprise networking environment in order to define the overall security risk 
assessment absolute value of the organization. 
Since NIDP systems were used at the enterprise level to shield the network 
against cyber-attacks, it was realised that there was a need to further explore 
these systems and propose a security risk metric. Two different NIDP 
systems were tested and compared in similar environments in order to find 
the most suitable system for the study. From the results based on the 
performance, Snort was chosen over Suricata. Using Snort, analysis was 
carried out in finding the maximum speeds at which no packet drops took 
place. Using this as test bench, security metrics measuring the absolute 
security level associated to the rules were developed; one to measure the 
impact while the other provides the risk associated with each individual 
attack category.  
All these methods provide important features that can be exploited by the 
security community to improve the standards for measuring the network 
security level. Presently, the available standards showed qualitative security 
level which did not provide the best method to analyse and to present the 
overall security risk measure of an organization.  The proposed methods 
provide enterprise network administrators with better measures and a clear 
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image of how secure their networks are. In order to further improve the 
metrics proposed in this work, the future work may address the following 
issues: 
 Security risk associated with the inside attack; with this study focusing 
on the effect of the attacks from the outside world, the attacks from 
the inside of the organization were not considered. Inside factors such 
as human factor, system user factor, company internal policies factor, 
etc. should also be the scope for future research. 
 Invisible attacks can be further explored in order to create a better 
generalised metric for this type of attack since this work focused on 
Google dorks based invisible attacks. For example, other forms of 
invisible attacks that can be examined are the Wi-Fi based invisible 
attacks and the possibility that other search engines have the same 
capability as the Google search engine. There is a possibility that 
other search engines have the capability to retrieve confidential 
information once the Google dorks based techniques are applied. 
 The security risk level of a company can also be assessed by the 
ranking of the results related to the company when Google dorks are 
used to search for information. For example, a company is more 
vulnerable if its information shows up on the first page than one which 
shows up on other pages. This analysis can be used to develop a 
weighted metric that shows the company how susceptible it is to 
Google dork based attacks. A company which shows up on the first 
page has a higher risk weight than one that shows up on the other 
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pages. This information can be used to extend the functionality of the 
proposed risk assessment method for invisible attacks in this work. 
 The developed metrics can also be linked with the attack graph tools 
to generate a system that automatically gives a detailed picture of the 
network security risk level while providing the overall absolute value of 
the security of the organization’s network. 
 This work focuses on the use of CVSS and OWASP rating 
methodology to design the quantitative security metrics. The format of 
developing the metric can be applied to different standards like IS1 
among others to develop different metrics. The achieved metrics can 
be compared with the proposed metrics. These metrics can be 
presented to companies as different standards by which to 
quantitatively evaluate their network security risk level.  
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APPENDIX A: CLASSIFICATION OF VULNERABILITIES 
This shows a sample of the vulnerabilities that were collected after scanning 
the case study company network using Nexpose Vulnerability scanning tool.
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APPENDIX B: INVISIBLE ATTACKS 
This shows a sample of the google dorks commands that can be used as 
invisible attacks for various purposes. 
inurl:ocw_login_username 
"Login to Usermin" inurl:20000  
intitle:"OnLine Recruitment Program - Login"  
intitle:"MailMan Login"  
intitle:"phpPgAdmin - Login" Language 
intitle:"EXTRANET login" -.edu -.mil -.gov 
intitle:"ePowerSwitch Login" 
intitle:"Employee Intranet Login" 
intitle:rapidshareintext:login 
inurl:orasso.wwsso_app_admin.ls_login 
inurl:ocw_login_username 
inurl:metaframexp/default/login.asp | intitle:"Metaframe XP Login" 
inurl:cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=login 
inurl:coranto.cgiintitle:Login (Authorized Users Only) 
intitle:"DocutekERes - Admin Login" -edu 
intitle:"Admin Login" "admin login" "blogware" 
intext:"Master Account" "Domain Name" "Password" inurl:/cgi-
bin/qmailadmin 
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intext:"Storage Management Server for" intitle:"Server Administration" 
intitle:"Admin login" "Web Site Administration" "Copyright" 
intitle:"ColdFusion Administrator Login" 
intitle:"Icecast Administration Admin Page" 
intitle:"ListMail Login" admin -demo 
intitle:adminintitle:login 
inurl:"wvdial.conf" intext:"password" 
intitle:rapidshareintext:login 
filetype:loginurl:"password.log" 
Please enter a valid password! inurl:polladmin 
admin account info" filetype:log 
Inurl:zebra.confintext:password -sample -test -tutorial -download 
filetype:configconfigintext:appSettings "User ID" 
filetype:incmysql_connect OR mysql_pconnect 
filetype:sql password 
Filetype:regreg +intext:"defaultusername" +intext:"defaultpassword" 
Inurl:"editor/list.asp" | inurl:"database_editor.asp" | inurl:"login.asa" "are 
set" 
Inurl:chap-secrets -cvs 
Inurl:ventrilo_srv.ini adminpassword 
Inurl:"slapd.conf" intext:"rootpw" -manpage -"Manual Page" -man: -
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sample 
Inurl:"wvdial.conf" intext:"password" 
Inurl:ospfd.confintext:password -sample -test -tutorial -download 
filetype:bltblt +intext:screenname 
ext:reg "username=*" putty  
inurl:/cgi-bin/pass.txt  
inurl:preferences.ini "[emule]"  
enable password | secret "current configuration" -intext:the 
ext:asa | ext:bakintext:uidintext:pwd -"uid..pwd" database | server | dsn 
ext:aspinurl:pathto.asp 
ext:log "Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services *.*"  
filetype:infinurl:capolicy.inf 
filetype:emleml +intext:"Subject" +intext:"From" +intext:"To"  
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APPENDIX C: ALERT GENERATED BY NIDP SYSTEM 
A list of alerts generated by NIDP system (Snort) during the case study. 
These are the alerts that were used to formulate the different security level 
(SL) metrics in this study. 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/08-12:39:18.352973 10.1.70.131:58530 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:162 
***AP*** Seq: 0x13A0B57F  Ack: 0x36DB9B03  Win: 0x200  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:13816:1] SPECIFIC THREAT Metasploit Framework xmlrpc.php 
command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/08-13:02:42.105108 10.2.190.254:51273 -> 154.241.88.201:80 
TCP TTL:61 TOS:0x0 ID:47330 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1200 DF 
***A**** Seq: 0x59CF46AF  Ack: 0xF50ED3B0  Win: 0xB7  TcpLen: 32 
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 917151 77829724 
[Xref =>http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2005-1921] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/10-12:01:37.594862 10.2.23.225:49793 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:155 
***AP*** Seq: 0xEFAAAD5B  Ack: 0x6F760D03  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
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[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:13819:1] WEB-MISC IBM Lotus Domino Web Server Accept-
Language header buffer overflow attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/10-12:46:14.909643 10.2.200.229:55728 -> 154.241.88.201:80 
TCP TTL:61 TOS:0x0 ID:61593 IpLen:20 DgmLen:328 DF 
***AP*** Seq: 0xC34B707  Ack: 0xD601D983  Win: 0x16D  TcpLen: 32 
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 1001342 148947698 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2008-2240][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29310] 
[**] [1:13819:1] WEB-MISC IBM Lotus Domino Web Server Accept-
Language header buffer overflow attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/10-12:46:18.143767 10.2.200.229:37764 -> 154.241.88.201:80 
TCP TTL:61 TOS:0x0 ID:21554 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1096 DF 
***AP*** Seq: 0xEC81DCD  Ack: 0xD872D8A7  Win: 0x16D  TcpLen: 32 
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 1002158 148950919 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2008-2240][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29310] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:00.982165 10.2.23.169:48509 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x148E8E60  Ack: 0xE758FBA8  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
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[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:05.996616 10.2.23.167:39951 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x1923212A  Ack: 0xABE6B221  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:10.970311 10.2.23.231:59757 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x1DE96CDD  Ack: 0xDA71BB2A  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:15.975006 10.2.23.122:44827 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x226EBB65  Ack: 0xCF5B121  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:20.999265 10.2.23.136:60613 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x274BE122  Ack: 0xD94AD8A1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
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[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:25.941717 10.2.23.251:42216 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x2B5D09E5  Ack: 0x95CF82B  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:30.950271 10.2.23.115:37212 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x301493CC  Ack: 0xEE3E1EAB  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:35.947788 10.2.23.47:55618 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x354691DD  Ack: 0xA744AFA1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:40.936833 10.2.23.193:49319 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
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TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x39C4A233  Ack: 0xAE8D4429  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:45.932408 10.2.23.252:56221 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x3E771449  Ack: 0x593C8A7  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:50.990288 10.2.23.37:33691 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x430C34DC  Ack: 0x57E70FA7  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:45:56.047270 10.2.23.183:32881 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x4768C3C8  Ack: 0x7E86E1A1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
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[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:01.020204 10.2.23.225:33017 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x4C8D3786  Ack: 0xE3554625  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:06.048755 10.2.23.220:46391 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x509D254C  Ack: 0xE33850AA  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:11.009707 10.2.23.184:47388 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x55421506  Ack: 0xCB20CBA5  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:21.000332 10.2.23.127:42794 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x5F152080  Ack: 0x326B71A9  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
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[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:25.997881 10.2.23.189:45442 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6436390D  Ack: 0xA2D57229  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:31.078430 10.2.23.0:43064 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x68C2A49F  Ack: 0xF4EBA929  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:36.030465 10.2.23.220:46403 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6D87D840  Ack: 0x1060ABAB  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:36.032120 10.2.23.220:46404 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
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TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:176 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6CD60D09  Ack: 0x3F896D29  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:36.032724 10.2.23.220:46406 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:182 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6D9EDD8D  Ack: 0x5B54E6B1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:36.033605 10.2.23.220:46405 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:170 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6CE5F0FB  Ack: 0xCB6A6FA7  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:36.069487 10.2.23.220:46408 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:177 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6D51896A  Ack: 0xADD25DAC  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
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[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:36.070277 10.2.23.220:46407 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6CD7481E  Ack: 0x65995A20  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:36.361276 10.2.23.220:46411 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:190 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6D7693D4  Ack: 0x1F92EBA9  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:36.357046 10.2.23.220:46409 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:178 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6D7FBC48  Ack: 0x1C8F76A7  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:36.365238 10.2.23.220:46410 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:171 
***AP*** Seq: 0x6D8BDBB7  Ack: 0x194B61B  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
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[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:41.176267 10.2.23.8:58559 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:163 
***AP*** Seq: 0x71F38594  Ack: 0x1DB0CC18  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:46.138434 10.2.23.96:56736 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x76D04146  Ack: 0x6C45A61E  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref => 
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:51.085691 10.2.23.135:39449 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x7B960381  Ack: 0x460A1FA5  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:46:56.055609 10.2.23.162:33627 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
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TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x7F77DF5E  Ack: 0xE9C1E2A6  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:47:01.156458 10.2.23.18:56395 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x84D52A46  Ack: 0x5D5A14A3  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:47:06.070262 10.2.23.135:39455 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x88FFFA78  Ack: 0x6A1B2C25  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:47:11.092987 10.2.23.125:50495 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x8E0B8DF9  Ack: 0xD6D664A5  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
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[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:47:16.072708 10.2.23.189:45470 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x922353E2  Ack: 0x49F8D3A6  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [119:7:1] (http_inspect) IIS UNICODE CODEPOINT ENCODING [**] 
[Priority: 3] 
11/11-09:47:37.332215 10.2.23.189:55531 -> 154.241.88.201:80 
TCP TTL:61 TOS:0x0 ID:15987 IpLen:20 DgmLen:417 DF 
***AP*** Seq: 0xA69FDE8D  Ack: 0x7DD9F954  Win: 0xB7  TcpLen: 32 
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 6349062 224644212 
[**] [119:7:1] (http_inspect) IIS UNICODE CODEPOINT ENCODING [**] 
[Priority: 3] 
11/11-09:47:38.635226 10.2.23.189:55533 -> 154.241.88.201:80 
TCP TTL:61 TOS:0x0 ID:38833 IpLen:20 DgmLen:690 DF 
***AP*** Seq: 0xA77975EE  Ack: 0x7F110A99  Win: 0xB7  TcpLen: 32 
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 6349389 224645513 
[**] [119:7:1] (http_inspect) IIS UNICODE CODEPOINT ENCODING [**] 
[Priority: 3] 
11/11-09:47:39.950385 10.2.23.189:55535 -> 154.241.88.201:80 
TCP TTL:61 TOS:0x0 ID:17254 IpLen:20 DgmLen:758 DF 
***AP*** Seq: 0xA8B5A0EE  Ack: 0x80B7A7CD  Win: 0xB7  TcpLen: 32 
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 6349718 224646826 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
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11/11-09:47:40.707137 10.2.23.160:32867 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xA9AFD4B7  Ack: 0xD99EBCA7  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:47:50.685040 10.2.23.251:42287 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xB2A3C871  Ack: 0xE477C1AB  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:47:55.622888 10.2.23.43:35565 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xB7BEF602  Ack: 0xFB33BFAB  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:00.622985 10.2.23.147:47750 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xBC4F08AF  Ack: 0x149FC79F  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
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[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:05.643484 10.2.23.120:57019 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xC1507F7D  Ack: 0xA7153628  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:10.678998 10.2.23.38:52217 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xC5D910E1  Ack: 0x7BBE120  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:15.714935 10.2.23.246:36213 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xCAE31ACD  Ack: 0xBFF1211D  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:20.691872 10.2.23.252:56336 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xCF6EF28A  Ack: 0xFA631C1F  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
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[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:35.790562 10.2.23.185:35803 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xDD056F91  Ack: 0xE20D57AB  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:40.782599 10.2.23.2:51228 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xE239F00A  Ack: 0x90CA49A6  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:45.756997 10.2.23.252:56375 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xE69B1618  Ack: 0x5EF06620  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:50.745404 10.2.23.140:34364 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
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TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xEB9659DD  Ack: 0x997FCC23  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:55.697047 10.2.23.158:33538 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xEFF0E8E2  Ack: 0x84725CA4  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:00.757175 10.2.23.27:49708 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xF4EBF6D7  Ack: 0x2392511D  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:05.671017 10.2.23.16:46736 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xF959FED6  Ack: 0xBDC0CA7  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
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[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:10.720977 10.2.23.219:50201 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xFE05FB97  Ack: 0x34DC8228  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:15.685464 10.2.23.213:50871 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x2CA8572  Ack: 0x75B5D4AA  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:20.652045 10.2.23.15:56035 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x7AFC16D  Ack: 0x6A7BBC1E  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:25.702889 10.2.23.119:55634 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xD28B9E6  Ack: 0xF3A6939D  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
  
149 
 
 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:30.657457 10.2.23.202:42093 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x11CB76E1  Ack: 0x23A71820  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:35.654151 10.2.23.63:35416 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x163B01EB  Ack: 0xEB23FF28  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:48:25.646206 10.2.23.22:55629 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0xD3577B7D  Ack: 0x2CF1041E  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:46.268776 10.2.23.87:53471 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
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TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x1F52DFE0  Ack: 0x8F74F7AB  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:50.693059 10.2.23.169:47295 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x23F994D0  Ack: 0x6D9AC1A9  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:49:55.702015 10.2.23.55:42321 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x293DBAF4  Ack: 0x251ED22A  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:50:00.705414 10.2.23.122:41807 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x2DB291A1  Ack: 0x5531502B  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
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[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:50:05.757625 10.2.23.61:33700 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x3201EF1E  Ack: 0x54942429  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:50:10.688385 10.2.23.219:53971 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x377FAE4B  Ack: 0xA5197A9C  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:50:15.705661 10.2.23.194:36743 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x3C3F93E5  Ack: 0x876A4029  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:01.138888 10.2.23.6:48282 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x7FE348A8  Ack: 0x9ACED59F  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
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[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:11.161773 10.2.23.162:56092 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x8904633F  Ack: 0x45AB8A1E  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:16.129100 10.2.23.24:58063 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x8E12DEA0  Ack: 0xCBD361A9  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:21.150288 10.2.23.143:33266 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x92A7C645  Ack: 0xEC874823  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:26.115250 10.2.23.185:34447 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
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TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x972BFE64  Ack: 0x65F0EB26  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:31.168447 10.2.23.50:32941 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9C59451D  Ack: 0x5FDB739E  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.553768 10.2.23.50:32942 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E0E63D1  Ack: 0xFCF33628  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.555563 10.2.23.50:32944 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9DEDDB11  Ack: 0xE05BE7AA  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
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[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.554753 10.2.23.50:32945 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E276AAF  Ack: 0xA2C213AA  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.615027 10.2.23.50:32946 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E399EA2  Ack: 0x5D2915A6  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.616333 10.2.23.50:32947 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:176 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9EA2BDF7  Ack: 0xBC853EAC  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.556441 10.2.23.50:32943 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:169 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9DE961C0  Ack: 0x74B609A6  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
  
155 
 
 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.988449 10.2.23.50:32948 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9EB91A3D  Ack: 0x64DF74A1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.995962 10.2.23.50:32949 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E9FF02D  Ack: 0x93A37D25  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.992612 10.2.23.50:32951 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E57DDE7  Ack: 0xC6FD6C1D  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.989807 10.2.23.50:32952 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
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TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9F310F5C  Ack: 0x8114DA23  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.990820 10.2.23.50:32950 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E701BE0  Ack: 0x16DC2DA1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.043814 10.2.23.50:32955 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E9BA415  Ack: 0xC56ECDA1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:33.993816 10.2.23.50:32953 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E687DEB  Ack: 0x7686DD9F  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
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[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.042861 10.2.23.50:32954 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9EE96BDA  Ack: 0x5DC3B9A1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.098795 10.2.23.50:32956 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9F262E9D  Ack: 0x44C51B9F  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.098298 10.2.23.50:32957 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9F0EAEE6  Ack: 0x99CB5C25  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.161794 10.2.23.50:32959 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9ECCD1B0  Ack: 0x119009B  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
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[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.104116 10.2.23.50:32958 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E6D8A14  Ack: 0xB266C91B  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.310569 10.2.23.50:32951 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:272 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E57DED0  Ack: 0xC6FD6D4F  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.325475 10.2.23.50:32948 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:272 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9EB91B26  Ack: 0x64DF75D3  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.325860 10.2.23.50:32950 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
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TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:287 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E701CC9  Ack: 0x16DC2ED3  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.334116 10.2.23.50:32949 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:272 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E9FF116  Ack: 0x93A37E57  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.364865 10.2.23.50:32953 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:272 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E687ED4  Ack: 0x7686DED1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.336341 10.2.23.50:32955 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:280 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E9BA4FE  Ack: 0xC56ECED3  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
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[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.352390 10.2.23.50:32952 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:280 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9F311045  Ack: 0x8114DB5C  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.379373 10.2.23.50:32954 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:272 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9EE96CC3  Ack: 0x5DC3BAD3  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.400220 10.2.23.50:32956 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:272 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9F262F86  Ack: 0x44C51CD1  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.417656 10.2.23.50:32957 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:299 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9F0EAFCF  Ack: 0x99CB5D57  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
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[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.469713 10.2.23.50:32960 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:286 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9F3C0BA8  Ack: 0x3CE3B29  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.473131 10.2.23.50:32961 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:274 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9EF4D1BA  Ack: 0x47C834A7  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.444883 10.2.23.50:32958 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:272 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9E6D8AFD  Ack: 0xB266CA4D  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.445527 10.2.23.50:32959 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
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TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:272 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9ECCD299  Ack: 0x11901CD  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
[**] [1:12592:3] SMTP ClamAV recipient command injection attempt [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1] 
11/11-09:56:34.518056 10.2.23.50:32962 -> 7.204.241.161:25 
TCP TTL:240 TOS:0x10 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:273 
***AP*** Seq: 0x9F11E0AB  Ack: 0xC37AAFA4  Win: 0x418  TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2007-4560][Xref 
=>http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25439] 
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APPENDIX D: NIDP SYSTEM RULE AGAINST INVISIBLE 
ATTACKS 
Following is a rule which can be used by network administrators to detect 
and prevent their organizations network against invisible attack. 
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